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Introduction
Scholars of corporate governance commonly divide the world into two
spheres: the Anglo-American "outsider" system and the continental Euro-
pean and Japanese "insider" system, each with a characteristic set of struc-
tural elements, ownership patterns, and strengths and weaknesses. 1 In
addition to having distinct corporate governance structures, inhabitants of
these two spheres make different assumptions about corporate goals. In
general, the Anglo-American approach is understood to valorize "share-
holder value,' 2 while the European approach includes a broader social
class of "stakeholders" -employees, creditors, suppliers, communities, and
even the environment-within the ambit of managerial concern.
3
During the last decade, a variety of academic disciplines, including
law, finance, and sociology, have paid sustained attention to the potential
convergence of these two systems of corporate governance.4 American law
professors who study convergence have primarily examined whether Euro-
pean companies are moving toward the Anglo-American pattern 5 -either
because of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 6 resulting from American
1. For some starting points in the extensive literature, see generally Ruth V. Agui-
lera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimen-
sions and Determinants, 28 AcAD. OF MGMT. REV. 447 (2003), which proposes a theory
that explains the differences between the Continental European stakeholder model and
the British and American shareholder model, and Rafael LaPorta et al., Corporate Owner-
ship Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999), which presents empirical evidence illustrat-
ing the different corporate ownership patterns in various countries.
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Prelim-
inary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2002) (asserting that "most modern aca-
demic commentary on corporate law . . .rests . . .on the principle of shareholder
primacy").
3. See Aguilera & Jackson, supra note 1, at 459-61.
4. For an overview of the convergence discussion in multiple disciplines, see gener-
ally Steen Thomsen, Convergence of Corporate Governance During the Stock Market Bub-
ble: Towards Anglo-American or European Standards?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FiRm ORGANIZATION 297-317 (Anna Grandori ed., 2004).
5. For overviews of the discussion among law professors, see generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Gov-
ernance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 646-47 (1999), which characterizes
the debate as one between neoclassical economists and another group of scholars
emphasizing the importance of political forces and path dependency, and Sanford M.
Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for Convergence, 22
COMP. LABOR L. & POL'Y J. 5 (2000), which summarizes legal, political, and social forces
driving convergence as well as factors such as path dependence and micro- and
macroeconomic forces that limit convergence. For a more critical view of convergence,
see Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22
COMp. LABOR L. & POL'YJ. 97, 123-26 (2000), which focuses on the allocation of power
between shareholders and labor. And for an optimistic pre-Enron account of the coming
predominance of the American shareholder-centric view of the firm, see Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439,
449-58 (2001).
6. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on
the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219 (1999) (examin-
ing whether cross-border mergers, such as the one between Chrysler and Daimler-Benz,
are likely to lead to convergence).
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institutional capital investing abroad, 7 or as a consequence of global com-
petition,8 each of which favors a focus on shareholder value. Contrary
views suggest that corporate governance systems will not converge to any
great extent because of politics, path dependence, and history.9 The Amer-
ican literature has paid far less attention to the opposite phenomenon: the
factors that may encourage British and even American companies to
engage in some degree of stakeholder thinking. This Article analyzes
recent legal developments that are promoting precisely this convergence.
Recent convergence on stakeholder thinking has been paralleled by
the emergence of the global corporate social responsibility ("CSR") move-
ment. We argue that there is a causal relationship between these parallel
developments and, specifically, that the CSR movement has been a major
factor in moving corporate governance theory in the stakeholder direction
by demanding that companies go beyond the creation of short-term share-
holder wealth in pursuit of broader objectives such as sustainable growth,
equitable employment practices, and long-term social and environmental
well-being. The CSR movement has pursued these objectives both directly,
by pressing for substantive changes in corporate behavior, and indirectly,
by promoting expanded disclosure of corporate social and environmental
information, in the expectation that shareholders will eventually force the
desired substantive changes. 10 In many countries, most notably the
United States, CSR advocates have had the daunting task of persuading the
corporate and legal communities to move from a narrow focus on share-
holders' immediate financial returns to a broader measure of corporate
well-being, what could be called "stakeholder value.""
Notwithstanding the difficulty of that task, we argue, the historically
unified Anglo-American front may be breaking down as a result of CSR
7. See Jacoby, supra note 5, at 14-18 (arguing that, while U.S. investment abroad
may facilitate a convergence on the U.S. "equity culture," such an outcome is unlikely
given differences in culture, history, and the role of labor).
8. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 449-52 (arguing that shareholder-
centered corporate governance systems have a competitive advantage in global product
and financial markets).
9. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (focusing on path
dependence); Jacoby, supra note 5 (concluding that the Anglo-American system of corpo-
rate governance and the Continental European style will remain distinct); Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1145, 1158-65 (1998) (arguing that
differences in corporate governance systems stem from differences in property rights
systems reinforced by inefficiencies in the market for political control).
10. For further discussion of the global CSR movement, see generally RUTH V. AGUI-
LERA ET AL., PUTTING THE S BACK IN CORPORATE SociAL RESPONSIBILITY: A MULTI-LEVEL
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONS (Univ. of Ill. Ctr. for Int'l Bus. Educ. &
Research, Working Paper No. 04-0107, 2004), available at http://www.ilir.uiuc.edu/
lubotsky/AguileraRuppWilliamsGanapathiuly04final.pdf. For background on expand-
ed social and environmental disclosure, see generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1197, 1273-99 (1999).
11. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New Corporate
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 611-15 (2001).
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advocates' actions and governments' and companies' reactions. 12 While
American corporate governance remains firmly focused on shareholder
value, the United Kingdom ("UK") appears to be setting out on a "third
way" that merges elements of the shareholder and stakeholder approaches.
On a number of governance issues, including takeovers and the role of
labor, the United Kingdom continues to resist European influences. 13 In
the realm of corporate social responsibility, however, Britain has very
recently emerged as a leader. Its "third way" explicitly advocates a shift in
focus to long-term, "enlightened shareholder value" and requires that com-
panies recognize and report on their effects on extended stakeholder con-
stituencies, such as employees, suppliers, communities, and the
environment. This Article describes and analyzes these new developments
and argues that they have major implications for the general theory of the
corporation.
The initial lens through which we examine pressures for pro-stake-
holder convergence is the identification and disclosure of corporate infor-
mation concerning social and environmental risks. When American
lawyers think of the identification of risk, they naturally think first of
financial accounting and the disclosure of financial risks and uncertain-
ties. Events in the United States in the last few years, in which the accuracy
of the financial statements of mainstream companies such as Enron,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Qwest, Xerox, Sunbeam, Waste Management,
and Cendant has been challenged, 14 have focused public and legislative
attention on the quality of companies' financial disclosure. Clearly, this
12. Some would argue that there never has been a "historically unified Anglo-Ameri-
can front." Professor Cheffins has examined the history of British share ownership pat-
terns and has shown that widely dispersed share ownership developed later in Britain
than in the United States, and for different reasons. See Brian R. Cheffins, History and
the Global Corporate Governance Revolution: The UK Perspective, Bus. HIST. Oct., 2001, at
87-88 (arguing that "the three factors that have been identified as important" in describ-
ing the necessary preconditions to the development of widely dispersed share owner-
ship-"company law, financial services regulation and political ideology-are not
decisive variables" in describing the history of British share ownership). Professors
Armour, Deakin, and Konzelmann have also suggested recently that there is not a uni-
fied "Anglo-American" concept of "shareholder wealth maximizing," and that any con-
sensus between the two countries about the social value of maximizing shareholder
wealth is fragile. See John Armour et al., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK
Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 531, 531-32 (2003). (Our analysis of
corporate governance in the UK was motivated in part by the excellent work of Profes-
sors Armour, Deakin, and Konzelmann. In particular, their discussion of the changing
behavior of institutional investors in the UK caused us to wonder why such a change was
occurring in the UK and not in the United States.) Yet, there clearly are important simi-
larities between the two systems, and a widely used intellectual construct, "Anglo-Ameri-
can corporate governance." It is to this intellectual construct that this Article is
addressed.
13. See Armour et al., supra note 12, at 534-36 (discussing takeover law in the UK);
Catherine Barnard et al., "Fog in the Channel, Continent Isolated": Britain as a Model for
EU Social and Economic Policy?, 34 INDUS. REL. J. 461, 463-69 (2003) (discussing resis-
tance in the UK to the EU's working time labor directives).
14. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashion-
ing Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 308-30 (2004).
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focus is appropriate, since accurate financial information is critical to
investors' confidence and to the proper functioning of the capital markets.
There is, however, another risk-related trend in world markets that has
been little noted in the American corporate law literature: the increasing
number of global firms that have started to report publicly about the social
and environmental risks they face. 15 In recent years, many of the world's
largest companies have started to produce social, environmental, or sus-
tainability reports (which integrate social, environmental, and financial
information) in addition to their financial reports. In 2002, 45% of the
Global Fortune Top 250 companies ("GFT250") produced a separate social,
environmental, or sustainability report, compared to 35% in 1999, and
compared to 13% of the Global 100 in 1993.16 In 2002, 29% of these
reports were independently verified, most often by accounting firms, up
from 19% in 1999.17 These statistics reflect trends that began in the early
1990s: the percentage of the top 100 companies in each of nineteen coun-
tries that have produced social reports grew from 13% in 1993 to 23% in
2002.18 And these percentages may be deceptively low, given much higher
reporting rates in some of the largest countries. Thus, in Japan, 72% of the
top 100 companies publish separate social reports; in the UK, 49% do; as
do 36% in the United States, and between 25% and 35% in Northern
Europe. 19
Much of this disclosure is based on companies' voluntary decisions to
engage in expanded triple-bottom-line (financial, social, and environmen-
tal) reporting. In some countries, however, there are newly promulgated
legal mandates that require the disclosure of much more information about
social and environmental risks. We focus on developments in the Euro-
pean Union ("EU"), France, and the UK as illustrative of the types of rules
being promulgated and contrast those with the more limited requirements
for social and environmental disclosure in the United States. We suggest
15. The term "social risk," as used in this Article, includes risks arising from compa-
nies' labor relationships and practices and risks arising from companies' relationships
with their communities and political environments in which they operate around the
world.
16. KPMG International Survey of Corporate Sustainability Reporting 2002, at 9
(2002), available at http://www.wimm.nl/publicaties/KPMG2002.pdf. The KPMG Sus-
tainability Group began publishing international surveys describing the increase in sus-
tainability reporting in 1993. However, the reporting rates of 1993 cannot be directly
compared to those of 2002 because various parameters changed over the years. See id. at
27 app. A.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 14. There is a wide range of specificity in these reports, as well as a wide
range of subjects covered. We evaluate the meaning of such reports in a companion
empirical project briefly described in Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerg-
ing Third Way: The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Theory, NEw AcAD.
REv., Autumn 2004, 96. Here, we simply point to them as an indication that the largest
companies worldwide are recognizing a value in reporting on their social and environ-
mental relationships, and we assert that these expanded communications are one
impact of the CSR movement.
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that this contrast illuminates the comparative conceptions of corporate
governance at the center of this discussion.
As we discuss in Part 1, current developments in the UK present an
especially revealing instance of the shareholder-stakeholder conflict. In
some important respects, British corporate law values and corporate gov-
ernance structures continue to be aligned with their American counter-
parts. The United States and the UK today share a pattern of widely
dispersed share ownership, in contrast to Europe and Japan, where more
companies are family-owned, otherwise have a dominant shareholder, or
exhibit patterns of concentrated bank share-ownership or cross-sharehold-
ing between bank and industry. 20 Both countries have well-developed
securities markets, and both depend upon similar mechanisms to promote
managerial accountability, including financial transparency, stock market
valuations, and the market for corporate control. 2 1 Moreover, the United
States and the UK both exhibit a form of shareholder capitalism, under
which the purpose of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth, in
contrast to the European stakeholder view, according to which managers
need to balance the interests of multiple constituencies when making
decisions. 22
This dichotomy has been evident in the EU's decades-long effort to
harmonize the national corporate laws of its Member States. 2 3 In the nego-
tiations over a proposed Thirteenth Directive dealing with hostile take-
overs, for example, the British government has advocated a position that
would facilitate such takeovers as a form of market discipline over ineffi-
20. See LaPorta et al., supra note 1, 491-511.
21. Like others, we are dubious that the market for corporate control is simply a
mechanism to promote managerial accountability, see, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover
Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271,
274-75 (2000) (arguing that by promoting managerial continuity, the poison pill does
not in fact harm shareholders and implying that increasing liquidity in the market for
corporate governance does not necessarily promote managerial accountability and
shareholder interests), since 98% of mergers or acquisitions in the United States are
"friendly" transactions, meaning that both companies' boards of directors agree to the
merger. MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 1.01
(2004). Moreover the majority of merged companies underperform in the market with
respect to their industry benchmark, see James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum:
Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 257 (2001),
while top managers will have received generous "golden handshakes" if they do not con-
tinue with the merged company, and multimillion dollar bonuses for completing a
merger-in many cases, even if they do stay on. See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute
Provisions: Timefor Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 144-47 (2001). Thus, a majority of
mergers and acquisitions could represent a failure of managerial accountability and a
huge transfer of wealth from a company and its shareholders to its managers, directors,
investment bankers, and lawyers. By this view, the market for corporate control func-
tions very badly if it is meant to promote managerial accountability. For a review of the
empirical evidence on the efficiency of the corporate control market, see Barnard et al.,
supra note 13, at 469-71.
22. See sources cited supra note 1; see also Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of
"Germany, Inc.": The Case of Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 498-501 (2001)
(providing an overview of the shareholder-stakeholder divide).
23. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
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cient companies.2 4 Strong resistance has come from stakeholder countries
such as Germany, where employee representatives on supervisory boards
have an equal say with shareholders in responding to takeover bids and
shareholding is concentrated in large financial institutions. 25
In other respects, though, shareholder capitalism in the UK is begin-
ning to diverge from its American counterpart and develop its third way: a
long-term enlightened shareholder value perspective with strong elements
of European stakeholder thinking. This divergence is occurring because a
number of institutions shaping corporate governance in the UK are requir-
ing or encouraging broader thinking about stakeholder interests.2 6 Such
institutional pressures either do not exist at the moment in the United
States or are present in much weaker form. These institutions include the
EU; the UK government; institutional investors, particularly pension funds
and insurance companies that are starting to attend to long-term risks such
as climate change; and nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs").
In our analysis of these differing institutional pressures, we focus par-
ticularly on differences in the composition of the institutional investor
community and the actions it takes. Both countries' markets have a high
level of institutional investment-over half of total share ownership in each
case-but the composition of this ownership differs. In the UK, the institu-
tional investor segment is dominated by pension funds and insurance com-
panies, which necessarily have a long-term perspective on investment
risk.2 7 In the United States, by contrast, mutual funds, which are likely to
have a shorter-term perspective, are far more prevalent. 28 Perhaps reflec-
tive of the long-term obligations of pension funds and insurance compa-
nies, a substantial percentage of institutional investment financial
managers in the UK are affiliated with socially responsible investment net-
works ("SRI") or informal SRI collaborations. 29 Institutional investor
industry groups have promulgated standards calling on portfolio compa-
nies to disclose information about their social and environmental risks and
about their management systems on an annual basis and have suggested
that a company's approach to social responsibility is among the corporate
governance concerns that will determine investor engagement and
action. 30 And institutional investors have established visible coalitions
among themselves and with government and NGOs to address long-term
problems such as climate change, HIV and AIDS, and government corrup-
24. See Barnard et al., supra note 13, at 469-73.
25. See id. at 473.
26. For an analysis of these institutional pressures, see Ian Jones & Michael Pollitt,
Understanding How Issues in Corporate Governance Develop, 12 CORP. Gov. 162 (2004).
27. See infra notes 237-242 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
29. For instance, eleven of the twenty leading fund managers for the UK pension
industry are members or affiliates of the UK Social Investment Forum, a socially respon-
sible investment fund trade group. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 265-269. These groups include the Associa-
tion of British Insurers ("ABI") and the Institutional Shareholders' Committee. See infra
notes 266-274 and accompanying text.
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tion in emerging economies.3 1 Through these and other actions described
below, institutional investors in the UK have acted, and reacted, to bring
stakeholder concerns and issues of social responsibility into the financial
mainstream in a way that has not happened in the United States.
Stakeholder influence in the UK can also be seen rather dramatically
in the process, still ongoing, of promulgating a new code concerning the
disclosure of environmental and social risks. On May 5, 2004, after an
extensive public consultation process, the British government introduced
draft regulations that will require 1290 British-based companies listed on
the London Stock Exchange ("LSE"), the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), or NASDAQ to publish an annual Operating and Financial
Review and Directors Report ("OFR"). 32 The OFR, among other things,
will require companies to identify material social and environmental risks
and to disclose information about those risks. This regulation is the culmi-
nation of a decade-long process of prestigious commissions examining cor-
porate governance in the UK.3 3 This process, in conjunction with
changing norms among British institutional investors, has also operated to
give greater prominence to corporate social and environmental issues.
In light of these developments in the UK, we suggest in Part II that the
conventional thinking about the dichotomy between the Anglo-American
shareholder model of the corporation and the European stakeholder model
needs to be refined in at least two ways. First, a British corporate govern-
ance system that embodies a concept of enlightened shareholder value may
be emerging to occupy a unique third position between the American
shareholder wealth-maximizing position and the continental stakeholder
model. As we interpret these developments, the UK's goal appears to be to
maintain its corporations' financial accountability to a constituency of dis-
persed, independent shareholders while simultaneously using market
forces to nudge companies in the direction of greater social responsibility.
Because of London's role as an important venue for cross-border securities
trades and fund management,34 the norms of corporate disclosure set by
London's institutional investors and fund managers can be expected to
influence actions beyond Britain.35 In fact, the social and environmental
31. See infra notes 281-287 and accompanying text.
32. The Draft Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors'
Report) Regulations 2005. See infra notes 132-168 and accompanying text.
33. This process is analyzed in Jones & Pollitt, supra note 26, at 163.
34. See Gordon L. Clark, London in the European Financial Services Industry: Loca-
tional Advantage and Product Complementarities, 2 J.EcoN. GEOGRAPHY 433, 433-34
(2002) (asserting that "[e]ven if Wall Street is much larger in terms of traded volume,
listed securities and total assets, London dominates cross-border transactions and is the
favoured location of many foreign banks and market intermediaries."). We thank Pro-
fessor Clark for bringing this point to our attention and emphasizing its significance.
35. Such an influence would be consistent with the UK's historical role as a progeni-
tor of corporate governance reform. See Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance
Reform: Britain as an Exporter, 8 HUME PAPERS ON PUB. POLY 10, 10-11 (2000). Profes-
sor Cheffins asserts that the UK has a "distinguished pedigree as an exporter of legal
concepts and innovations," which he illustrates with several examples from UK com-
pany law. Id. Though the UK has gradually been losing influence in this regard, it is
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transparency newly required by the OFR may become the global gold stan-
dard of corporate governance. England may thus recapture some of the
influence of her lost mercantile empire by becoming the world's de facto
corporate governance regulator. 3 6 Second, even in the United States,
where market pressures have advanced the concept of shareholder primacy
to a greater extent than in other countries, stakeholders' interests are start-
ing to be articulated with more vigor and efficacy within the corporation.
Here too, the global CSR movement is blurring the edges of the traditional
shareholder-stakeholder distinction.
Despite these trends that we regard as generally positive, two caveats
are in order. First, at several points in the Article we inject a cautionary
note based on early results from a companion empirical project.3 7 In order
to examine the practical effects of the legal developments we discuss here,
we have begun to interview people in corporations, NGOs, socially respon-
sible investing funds, "mainstream" investment funds, and public relations
firms, both in the United States and in the UK; have attended major CSR
gatherings (both real and online) as ethnographic observers; and have
undertaken linguistic analyses of a number of published CSR reports.
Multinational corporations have begun to engage in new forms of commu-
nications, including stakeholder dialogues and wide-ranging social and
environmental reports. While these communications are a reaction to
heightened legal requirements and social expectations, the companies
themselves have a major role in controlling the discussion and debate and
thereby shaping the same social expectations to which they are ostensibly
responding. It is thus unclear whether these communication strategies will
lead to substantive changes in corporate behavior or will simply provide
"safe" (from the companies' point of view) venues for the disaffected to let
off steam. This pragmatic question, which is central to our empirical
research, must be answered before the ultimate impact of the legal develop-
ments we discuss in this Article can fully be evaluated.
Second, the "corporate governance complex" in every country today
includes managerial and shareholder as well as stakeholder influences.
Notwithstanding the developments we have just reviewed, there are clearly
shareholder value pressures at work in the UK, and we do not mean to
suggest otherwise. The mergers and acquisitions culture, the financial
seeking to recapture its former position through its ongoing Company Law Reform
process.
36. We recognize that the disclosure standards and particularly the accounting stan-
dards of the United States typically have been regarded as the most stringent in the
world. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
1757, 1788-90 (2002). Moreover, enforcement concerning disclosure in the United
States is more vigorous, given the resources of both the government and private plain-
tiffs. See id. at 1793-97. With respect to social and environmental disclosure, we assert
that the London standard is surely going to become the better standard, at least unless
the United States starts to require more information about long-term social and environ-
mental risks.
37. These preliminary findings, as well as our empirical methods, are discussed in
Williams & Conley, supra note 19.
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press, financial globalization, and managerial self-interest are powerful
incentives for companies to focus on short-term stock valuations.38 The
pro-stakeholder influences of the CSR movement are still minority cross-
currents in the United States, and probably remain such even in the UK.
They may ultimately prove to be weak, ephemeral, and therefore ineffective
at fundamentally changing the views of company directors and managers
about what their job is and whose interests they ought to consider. None-
theless, we argue, the relatively stronger pro-stakeholder influences in the
UK are already leading to a subtle shift in the conceptualization of the cor-
porate purpose from maximizing shareholder wealth in the short term, as
in the United States, to the creation of a broader-based and longer-term
"enlightened shareholder value."
The structure of this Article is straightforward. Part I analyzes recent
legal developments in several countries that are simultaneously reflecting
and promoting convergence on the stakeholder model. We review recent
enactments in the EU and several of its member countries, the ongoing
CSR and corporate governance reform process in the UK, and some little-
discussed but potentially significant provisions in the United States. Part II
develops the implications of these developments, particularly those in the
UK, for corporate governance theory. The Article concludes with some
thoughts about the future influence of the CSR movement both here and
abroad.
1. Mandated Disclosure of Social and Environmental Risks
The last few years have seen concentrated attention on questions of
corporate governance, much of it focused on financial issues. Comparative
corporate law writers have reveled in the fascinating nuances of different
countries' corporate governance systems and debated possibilities of con-
vergence. 39 European and Japanese companies and their home countries
38. See DON YOUNG & PAT ScoTt, HAVING THEIR CAKE . .. How THE CITY AND BIG
BOSSES ARE CONSUMING UK BUSINESS 35-46 (2004) (discussing the pressures from the
financial press, investment bankers, and the mergers and acquisitions culture to empha-
size shareholder value); Armour et al., supra note 12, at 534-36 (asserting that the UK
regulations governing mergers and acquisitions have the effect of encouraging directors
to focus on short-term shareholder wealth); Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and
Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1377-84 (2002) (argu-
ing that managers justify decisions by referring to their duty to increase "shareholder
value" when, in fact, the decisions primarily advance the managers' own interests). We
recognize that on the most robust view of the efficient capital market hypothesis
("E.C.M.H"), there should not be a difference between the long-term value of a company
(and thus managing for the long term) and a company's current stock value. See Lynn
Stout, The Mechanics of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J.
CoRP. L. 635, 637. Yet, some of the assumptions underlying the E.C.M.H. may be overly
optimistic, particularly those regarding the ability of the market to accurately value long-
term risks and investments. See id. Explicitly adopting a policy framework to encourage
managing for the long term, as the UK has, may, in fact, lead to different management
decisions. Cf. id. at 636-39 (discussing factors that encourage managers in the United
States to focus on short-term profits).
39. See generally Coffee, supra note 5 (discussing convergence in securities
regulation).
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have come under increasing pressure to adopt the American idea of share-
holder value as the definitive measure of a well-functioning company,
40
and the EU has continued to examine issues of corporate governance and
corporate law. 4 1 This attention has only intensified in the post-Enron era.
That event has inspired a debate in the United States about how mecha-
nisms of management accountability can be improved, and a correspond-
ing discussion in Europe about the extent to which European companies
are vulnerable to Enron-style governance meltdowns.
42
During the same period, however, a number of countries in the EU
and the EU itself have issued recommendations or passed laws to require
companies to identify and disclose social and environmental risks. These
developments, we argue, are an aspect of a fundamental debate over which
model of the corporation should prevail-the shareholder model or the
stakeholder model. We do not claim that there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between a requirement of broader nonfinancial disclosure and a
stakeholder model of the corporation because much of the expanded dis-
closure has as its goal better informing investors.43 We do contend, how-
ever, that these new disclosure policies have important implications for
corporate governance theory and the convergence debate. This Part
describes these international developments, and their implications are
developed in Part III.
A. The European Union
Legal developments at the EU level have come against the background
of steps by individual Member States in the direction of mandated social
and environmental reporting. For example, France,4 4 Belgium,4 5 Ger-
40. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 439 (arguing that there is an
emerging consensus that corporate law should principally strive to increase shareholder
value); O'Connor, supra note 5, at 123-26 (examining the influence of institutional
investors on corporate governance standards). See generally Coffee, supra note 5 (dis-
cussing corporate migration and cross-listing as factors facilitating convergence of dis-
closure standards).
41. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the Euro-
pean Union-A Plan To Move Forward, COM(2003)284 final; OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance, 2004, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/3155
7724.pdf.
42. For an overview, see Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and
Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L. J. 723,
735-44, 773-77 (2003) and Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from
Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911,
912-33 (2003).
43. As will be seen below, in the UK, expanded nonfinancial disclosure came about
as a direct result of attention being paid to matters of corporate governance, whereas in
the rest of the EU and in various other European countries the new requirements arise
more directly from financial integration and sustainable development policy initiatives.
44. Law No. 2001-152 of Feb. 19, 2001,J.O., Feb. 20, 2001, p. 2774 (Fr.) (amending
CODE DU TRAVAIL arts. 443, 444) (setting forth the social, environmental, and ethical
considerations that fund managers should take into account when buying or selling
stocks).
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many,4 6 and the UK 47 have passed laws that require pension funds to dis-
close the extent to which they take ethical, social, and environmental
information into account in constructing their investment portfolios. 4 8
The thinking behind these laws is that as pension fund managers start to
ask companies for information on these issues, the companies will respond
by making the information more generally available. 49  Acting more
directly, Denmark,50 the Netherlands, 5 1 Norway5 2, and Sweden 53 have all
required companies to provide expanded environmental information in
their annual reports, starting with Denmark in 1999. 5 4
It is France, however, that has been the leader in the field of required
social and environmental disclosure. On May 15, 2001, as part of a pack-
age of amendments to French company law known as the "New Economic
Regulations" (Nouvelles Regulations Economiques or "NRE"), France enacted
what are by far the most extensive requirements for companies to disclose
social and environmental information. 5 5 The NRE primarily dealt with
issues such as financial transparency, corporate governance, and antitrust
reform, but one section, Article 116, implemented a mandate for "triple-
bottom-line" reporting for all companies traded on the French stock
45. Law of April 28, art. 42(3), Moniteur Belge (2d ed.), May 15, 2003, p. 26,407
(Belg.) (requiring pension organizations to consider social, ethical, and environmental
impact when formulating their investment strategies).
46. See SusAN A. AARONSON & JAMES T. REEVES, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
GLOBAL VILLAGE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY 21 (2003); Gesetz zur Reform gesetzlicher
Rentenversicherung und zur F6rderung eines kapitalgedeckten Altersvorsorgeverm6gens
(Altersverm6gensgesetz-AVmG) v. 29.06.2001 (BGBI. I S. 403) (F.R.G.) (providing that
pension funds must disclose how social and environmental factors affect their invest-
ment decision).
47. Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bank-
ruptcy etc.) Amendment Regulations, § 2(4), (1999) S1 1999/1849) (Eng.) (amending SI
1996/3127) requires trustees of occupational pension funds to disclose "the extent to
which social, environmental, or ethical considerations are taken into account" when
making investment decisions.
48. These various developments are summarized in AARONSON & REEVES, supra note
46, at 109 app. 4 (2002).
49. Since these requirements are relatively new, none dating back to before 1999,
any assessment is necessarily tentative. See id.
50. The Ministry of Social Affairs has developed a "social index" that indicates com-
panies' levels of social responsibility. An English explanation is at http://www.detsocial
eindeks.dk/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
51. Uitvoeringsregeling milieuverslaglegging, Dec. 14, 1998, Staatscourant 1998,
248 pag. 11 (Dec. 24, 1998) requires companies to report on any environmental effects
of their activities. This is a regulation of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and
the Environment.
52. See AARONSON & REEVES, supra note 46, at 109 app. 4.
53. Lag om allmanna pensionsfonder [National Pension Funds Act], Svensk f6rfattn-
ingssamling [SFS] 2000:192, available at http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sfst/index.
asp, requires companies to draw up an annual business plan that describes how invest-
ment decisions take environmental and ethical considerations into account.
54. See AARONSON & REEVES, supra note 46, at 109 app. 4.
55. See Decree No. 2002-221 of Feb. 20, 2002, J.O., Feb. 21, 2002, p. 3360 (regard-
ing the application of CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 155-102-1 and modifying
Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, J.O., Mar. 24, 1967, p. 2843).
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exchange (the Bourse de Paris).5 6
Article 116 of the NRE requires each French company traded on the
Bourse to provide extremely detailed environmental, labor, community
involvement, health, and safety information in its annual reports to share-
holders.5 7 The required environmental information includes specifics on
the use of resources such as water, energy, and raw materials; information
on emissions that could cause air, water, noise, or olfactory pollution; a
company's environmental management systems and efforts to reduce envi-
ronmental impacts; accounting reserves for environmental risks; and the
amounts of fines and monetary awards paid because of environmental
damage.58 This information must be supplied for both the company's loca-
tions in France and its sites abroad. The required social disclosures
include very detailed information about the labor arrangements within
companies, such as the numbers of short- and long-term workers and
"external workers"; the organization of working hours and overtime; gen-
der equity; labor relationships and collective bargaining agreements; health
and safety; use of subcontractors; and how the company takes the territo-
rial impact of its activity on employment and regional development into
account. 59 While companies have been required to collect some of this
labor information since 1977 and report it to plant-level Works Councils, it
is only since Article 116 was passed that the information must be publicly
disclosed in companies' annual reports.
60
Despite these national precedents, progress at the EU level has come
in fits and starts. Since 1968, the EU has been in the process of trying to
harmonize the company laws ("corporate laws" in American parlance) of
Member States in accordance with the Treaty of Rome, which created the
European Economic Community.6 1 While some aspects of this process
have proceeded smoothly, such as harmonizing financial disclosure and
recognizing the validity of corporate contract obligations, 6 2 certain issues
56. See AARONSON & REEVES, supra note 46, at 21.
57. Law no. 2001-420, art. 116, May 15, 2001, J.0., May 16, 2001, p. 7776.
58. Decree No. 2002-221 of Feb. 20, 2002, art. 2,J.O. Feb. 21, 2002, p. 3360 (adding
art. 148-3 to Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, J.O., Mar. 24, 1967, p. 2843).
59. Id.
60. Mary Lou Egan et al., France's Nouvelles Regulations Economiques: Using Govern-
ment Mandates for Corporate Reporting To Promote Environmentally Sustainable Eco-
nomic Development 10 (2003), available at http://www.bendickegan.com/pdf/Egan
MauleonWolffBendick.pdf.
61. See Company Law: Introduction, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/12
6002.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). Harmonization typically proceeds by means of
Directives, which are proposed by the European Commission (the EU executive) and
passed by the Council of the European Union (a legislative body composed of Member
State ministers). Introducing the European Union, at http://europa.eu.int/institutions/
index en.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). The European Parliament, which is directly
elected by the EU citizenry, usually exercises its co-decisionmaking power to adopt EU
legislation. Id. Member States are required to implement Directives through national
legislation. Company Law: Introduction, supra; see also Decision-making in the Euro-
pean Union, at http://europa.eu.int/institutions/decision-making/index-en.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2005).
62. These and other topics were encompassed in the First Council Directive 68/151,
1968 Oj. (L 065) 8, the Second Council Directive 77/91, 1977 Oj. (L 026) 1, the Third
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have been more problematic and have taken more than thirty years to
resolve. These include the role of employees in publicly-traded companies
(that is, whether to adopt codetermination as a required element of EU
company law)6 3 and the proper role of the board of directors in evaluating
takeover proposals. 64 The extended difficulty in arriving at a uniform res-
olution of these and other issues has been caused, in the EU's official esti-
mation, "by political deadlock, revealing the fundamental differences
between Member States' traditions in the company law field."'6 5 The spe-
cific basis for this deadlock, in our judgment, is the ongoing competition
between the shareholder and stakeholder models of the corporation.
Notwithstanding these differences, in the last five years the harmoni-
zation process has seen extensive discussion of the social and environmen-
tal responsibilities of companies, culminating in the enactment of new
social and environmental disclosure obligations.6 6 These enactments are
Council Directive 78/855, 1978 OJ. (L 295) 36, the Fourth Council Directive 78/660,
1978 OJ. (L 222) 11, the Sixth Council Directive 82/891, 1982 OJ. (L 378) 47, the
Seventh Council Directive 83/349, 1983 OJ. (L 193) 1, revised by 1983 OJ. (L 211) 31,
and the Eighth Council Directive 84/253, 1984 OJ. (L 126) 20; see also Company Law:
Introduction, supra note 61 (discussing the evolution of EU company law).
63. This issue was raised in a Fifth Council Directive that was proposed in 1972 and
withdrawn in 2001. See Company Law: Introduction, supra note 61. In its stead, the
Council adopted a regulation in 2001 that established a new type of entity, a European
Company (known as an "S.E." short for the Latin Societas Europaea), Council Regulation
2157/2001, art 1(1), 2001 OJ. (L 294) 1, 3, under which companies must choose either
to have employees represented on the board or boards (depending on whether a one-tier
or two-tier board structure is chosen), or represented by a separate body, such as a
union. Council Regulation 2001/86, art. 3, 2001 OJ. (L 294) 22. Every S.E. must
choose one of these forms of employee participation. Id. at art. 3(1). These statutes
entered into force October 11, 2004, id. at art. 16, so it is too soon to tell how many
companies will take advantage of them.
64. This issue was contained in the 1989 Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive
on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, 1989 OJ. (C 034) 8,
which was rejected by the European Parliament in 2001 and superseded in 2002. Propo-
sal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids, 2003
O.J. (C 045) 1. The substitute proposal issued in October 2002 was intended, among
other things, to clarify employees' rights to information and consultation and "create a
body of truly European company law." Company Law: Introduction, supra note 61. It
was issued as a Directive in April 21, 2004. Directive 2004/25, 2004 OJ. (L 142) 12.
65. Company Law: Introduction, supra note 61.
66. See, e.g., Communication from the European Commission, Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development COM(2002)347
final at 4, 8 (adopting "Principles for Community Action," and emphasizing the "volun-
tary nature of CSR"); Green Paper, Promoting a European Framework for Corporate
Social Responsibility, COM(2001)366 final (discussing the goals of CSR in the EU). The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") has also
encouraged the discussion of the social and environmental responsibilities of publicly
traded companies by recognizing a role for stakeholders in corporate governance. See
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 41, § IV, "The Role of Stakehold-
ers in Corporate Governance." (The OECD is an international organization with thirty
industrialized nation members.) The general principle articulated in Section III is that
"[tihe corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of
financially sound enterprises." Id. In developing the 2001 Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance, the OECD structured a process of discussion and debate that involved busi-
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part of a complex of policies6 7 adopted by Europe's heads of state and
governments in Lisbon in March 2000 that are designed to make the EU
"the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs
and greater social tohesion."68 This "Lisbon Strategy" was then amended
at a subsequent meeting of the European Council 69 in Stockholm to add an
environmental dimension to the initial political and economic commit-
ment. Thus, sustainable development that promotes "economic growth,
social cohesion and environmental protection" is Europe's current goal.
70
The EU's attention to corporate governance reform is informed by its
efforts to promote sustainable development. Accordingly, a recent Com-
munication on Corporate Governance from the European Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament in 2003 proceeded on the
assumption that "[wiell managed companies, with strong corporate govern-
ance records and sensitive social and environmental performance, out-
perform their competitors. ' 7 1 The Commission recognized that these goals
required an approach "fully integrated" into its related initiatives to inte-
grate the capital markets, enhance the quality of financial reporting,
develop industrial policies to achieve sustainable economic development,
and examine corporate social responsibilities.
72
ness, labor, and civil society. Id. at 4. It also created a mechanism to try to implement
the Principles, requiring each of the thirty countries (including the United States) to
establish a National Contact Point to publicize the Principles, and resolve disputes about
corporate behavior. Id. at 31. To date, the Principles have been poorly implemented,
with France, Belgium and the Netherlands as exceptions, see AARONSON & REEVES, supra
note 46, at 12, but they have kept issues of CSR on the European agenda, as well as
provided standards by which to judge government policymaking in this area.
67. The complexity of the policies themselves and the networks of committees and
organizations that design and implement them are a striking example of the "new gov-
ernance" approach to regulation, which we discuss infra note 169.
68. Jennifer Blanke & Augusto Lopez-Carlos, World Economic Forum, The Lisbon
Review, 2004: An Assessment of Policies and Reforms in Europe 1, available at http://
unpanl .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN010324.pdf (quot-
ing remarks of the President of the European Council).
69. This "European Council" is not the same as the legislative body officially called
the Council of the European Union, which is discussed in note 61 supra. In the bewil-
dering world of "eurojargon," there are actually three different European bodies that
have the word "council" in their names: the European Council, which is the quarterly
policysetting meeting of the heads of state and government of the EU member countries,
plus the president of the European Commission; the Council of the EU, just discussed;
and the Council of Europe, a non-EU intergovernmental organization that seeks to pro-
mote human rights. See A Plain Language Guide to Eurojargon, at http://europa.eu.int/
abc/eurojargon/index.en.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
70. Communication from the Commission to the Gothenburg European Council, A
Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Devel-
opment 2, COM(2001)264 final.
71. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the Euro-
pean Union-A Plan to Move Forward 3, COM(2003)284 final.
72. Id.; see also Communication of the Commission, Implementing the Framework
for Financial Markets, COM(1999)232 final; Communication from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament, EU Financial Reporting Strategy: The Way
Forward, COM(2000)359 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council,
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It is in the specific contexts of capital market integration and enhance-
ment of financial reporting that the EU has issued regulations requiring
expanded nonfinancial disclosure. In its May 15, 2001 Communication on
the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, the Commission "invited"
companies with 500 employees or more to publish a triple-bottom-line
report in their annual report to shareholders, evaluating their performance
against economic, environmental, and social criteria. 73 At that time, the
Commission also adopted Recommendation 2001/453/EC on the recogni-
tion, measurement, and disclosure of environmental issues in annual
reports and financial accounts. 7 4 This Recommendation was described as
necessary to meet the informational needs of "different stakeholders,
including regulatory authorities, investors, financial analysts and the pub-
lic in general," with a primary goal of ensuring that "users of financial
statements [have] information about the impact of environmental risks and
liabilities on the financial position of the company, and about the com-
pany's attitude towards the environment. ' 75 The Recommendation applies
to a broad range of companies -all companies covered by the original direc-
tives aimed at harmonizing financial reporting76 -and suggests that com-
panies should be required to disclose and incorporate into their financial
accounts thirty-nine highly specific categories of environmental informa-
tion.7 7 The Recommendation suggests that the annual report to sharehold-
ers discuss environmental issues facing a company and its response. 78 It
calls specifically for descriptions of the company's policies and programs,
improvements it has made in environmental protection, and information
on its environmental performance in such areas as energy use, water use,
emissions, and waste disposal. 79 As the Recommendation states, the pur-
pose of this disclosure is to permit "users of the annual report to be able to
ascertain to what extent environmental protection is an integral part of the
the European Parliament, The Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of
the Regions, Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe, COM(2002)714 final; Communi-
cation from the Commission, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution
to Sustainable Development, COM(2002)347 final; Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Gothenburg European Council, A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A
European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development, COM(2001)264 final.
73. Communication from the Commission to the Gothenburg European Council, A
Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Devel-
opment 8, COM(2001)264 final.
74. Commission Recommendation, The Recognition, Measurement and Disclosure
of Environmental Issues in the Annual Accounts and Annual Reports of Companies,
2001 OJ. (L 156) 33.
75. Commission Recommendation, Annex § 1(4), 2001 OJ. (L 156), at 35.
76. These were the Fourth and Seventh Commission Company Law Directives,
enacted, respectively, in 1978 and 1983. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
77. The recommendations for environmental accounting include principles for the
recognition of environmental expenditures and liabilities, and site dismantling and res-
toration costs, for adjusting the values of impaired assets, provisions for site restoration
or dismantling, and for discounting future costs to present value. Commission Recom-
mendation, Annex § 3, 2001 OJ. (L 156), at 37-38.
78. Id. at Annex. § 4, 2001 OJ. (L 156), at 40.
79. Id. at Annex § 4(2).
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company's policies and activities." 80
In 2003, this Recommendation was followed by a Directive of Parlia-
ment and the Council amending the 1978 and 1983 directives that had
begun the process of harmonizing financial reporting within Europe.8 1
The 2003 amendments, referred to as the Modernization Directive, are part
of a process of incorporating International Accounting Standards into EU
companies' financial reporting. 8 2 As of 2005, companies will be required
to include "a fair review of the development and performance of the com-
pany's business and of its position, together with a description of the prin-
cipal risks and uncertainties that it faces" in their annual reports.8 3 The
Modernization Directive requires that "[tjo the extent necessary for an
understanding of the company's development, performance or position,
the analysis shall include both financial and where appropriate, nonfinan-
cial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, includ-
ing information relating to environmental and employee matters."'8 4 The
Parliament and Council suggested that the requirement to provide nonfi-
nancial information was "in line with current best practice." It added:
[W]here appropriate [it should] lead to an analysis of environmental and
social aspects necessary for an understanding of the company's develop-
ment, performance or position. This is consistent also with Commission
Recommendation 2001/453/EC of 30 May 2001 [discussed immediately
above] on the recognition, measurement and disclosure of environmental
issues in the annual accounts and annual reports of companies.
85
While Member States were given the power to exempt small and
medium enterprises from the nonfinancial disclosure obligations if they
80. Id. at Annex § 4(2)(a).
81. Directive 2003/51, 2003 Oj. (L 178) 16. This Directive was passed under the
co-decision procedure, which requires passage by both Parliament and the Council.
(The EU's decisionmaking process is discussed supra note 61.)
82. The international accounting standards are being promulgated by the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board ("I.A.S.B.") in London, Directive 2003/51, 2003 Oj.
(L 178), at 16, pmbl. § 7, which is a private standards-setting organization. Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board, About Us: Mission Statement, at http://www.iasb.
org/about/index.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). The European Commission is repre-
sented in the I.A.S.B. process. Press Release, International Accounting Standards Com-
mittee, European Consultative Group on Accounting Issues Affecting Financial
Institutions To Be Created (Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.iasb.org/news/iascf.
asp?showPageContent=NO&xml=10 80 38_10022004.htm.
83. Directive 2003/51, art. 1, 14(a), 2003 Oj. (L 178), at 18.
84. Id. We understand from Rob Lake, Head of Corporate Engagement, at Hender-
son Global Investment, and a member of the UK Operating and Financial Review Work-
ing Group on Materiality, discussed below, that the EU Parliament and Council used the
language "to the extent necessary for an understanding" of a business's performance or
position instead of the more familiar language "to the extent material to an understand-
ing," in order to avoid the connotation that what was being asked for was more financial
disclosure, since in many contexts "material" information is understood to be financial
information. Rob Lake, Presentation to the Institute of Responsible Investment Confer-
ence on Nonfinancial Disclosure, Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship
(April 21, 2004) (notes on file with the authors).
85. Directive 2003/51/EC, pmbl. § 9, 2003 O.J. (L 178), at 17.
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chose,8 6 large public reporting companies throughout Europe will now be
expected to provide much more social aid environmental information
annually, and, more specifically, to account for environmental costs and
potential liabilities.
So far, then, several general trends can be identified in the EU and
various of its Member States with respect to nonfinancial disclosure. First,
these legal initiatives, whether at the EU or national level, are related to
general policies to promote sustainable development. France, for instance,
is operating under its second National Strategy for Sustainable Develop-
ment (the first having been passed in 1997), which recognizes that sustain-
able development cannot be achieved by isolated policy initiatives, but
"must be reflected in a systematic network of efforts involving numerous
disciplines and partners."'8 7 Second, and consistent with the French policy
statement, information-forcing regulations aim to encourage changes in
firm behavior by empowering government agencies, NGOs, consumers,
and investors to make decisions based on a wider range of information
about firms' social and environmental records and impacts. 88 Third, the
countries with the most expansive national disclosure regulations are also
countries where a stakeholder concept of the firm predominates-France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.8 9
Consequently, the EU's own gradual turn in the direction of mandatory
disclosure can plausibly be read as a reflection of the broader European
penetration of the stakeholder concept.90 While this is not surprising, it is
an important background construct against which to evaluate the develop-
ments in the UK to which we now turn.
86. Id. at art. 1(14)(b), 2003 O.J. (L 178), at 18.
87. Egan et al., supra note 60, at 6.
88. Communication of the Commission, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business
Contribution to Sustainable Development, COM(2002)347 final, at 4-6 (discussing the
impact of globalization, which has increased the responsibilities of businesses, and urg-
ing that consumers, NGOs, and investors need more information in order to "reward...
socially and environmentally responsible firms," and financial stakeholders can "iden-
tify the success and risk factors inherent in a company and its responsiveness to public
opinion").
89. Cf. StephenJ. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Secur-
ities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1657, 1719-22 (2002) (discussing empirical evidence
showing European companies engaging in more voluntary nonfinancial disclosure);
Aguilera and Jackson, supra note 1, at 459-61 (discussing European stakeholder con-
cept of the firm).
90. It is difficult to say whether acceptance of the stakeholder concept has facilitated
greater acceptance of CSR objectives in Europe, or whether pressure from the CSR move-
ment has forced greater recognition of stakeholders' informational interests. What is
clear is that CSR and stakeholder corporate governance theory pursue similar goals,
albeit with different structural mechanisms as with regard to employee participation in
the firm. This is obviously an important difference concerning how power is exercised
in the firm, but here we are focusing on understandings of the proper goals for the
exercise of that power, and specifically who and what counts as an important interest to
consider when exercising power.
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B. The United Kingdom
Although the UK is a member of the EU in all respects except cur-
rency, it has pursued an innovative and independent course in dealing with
corporate governance and CSR. Indeed, the past ten years have clearly
been the decade of deliberation about corporate governance in the UK. 9 1
Five major committees have evaluated various aspects of corporate govern-
ance, making recommendations about accounting practices, executive com-
pensation, board composition, and expanded nonfinancial disclosure. 9 2
The British government began a Company Law Review in 1998 to respond
to these committees and modernize and integrate company law.9 3 A num-
ber of specialized reviews have also been influential, including the Myners
Review of the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, which is discussed
in detail below.9 4
1. Cadbury Committee
The first of these committees, the highly influential Cadbury Commit-
tee, 9 5 was constituted in 1991 by the accounting profession in a post-Enron
type of environment caused by the spectacular collapse of Robert Max-
well's financial empire (and his apparent suicide)96 and the collapse of the
Polly Peck company. 97 Concerned that the two companies' accountants
had failed to prevent the enormous losses that ensued, the Institute of
91. See generally Jones & Pollitt, supra note 26, at 162.
92. The results of these committees are embodied in the Commission on the Finan-
cial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance (1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cad
bury.pdf [hereinafter Cadbury Report]; Director's Remuneration: Report of a Study
Group (1995), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf [here-
inafter Greenbury Report]; Hampel Commission, European Corporate Governance Insti-
tute, Final Report (1998), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel-
index.htm [hereinafter Hampel Report]; Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (1999),
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/turnbul.pdf [hereinafter Turnbull
Report]; and Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Direc-
tors (2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/higgsreport.pdf [herein-
after Higgs Report].
93. See Company Law Review Steering Group, Department of Trade and Industry,
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999),
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/comlawfw/.
94. See infra notes 251-263 and accompanying text.
95. SeeJones & Pollitt, supra note 26, at 164 (describing Cadbury as "internationally
recognised as having been seminal in the development of corporate governance in the
U.K. and elsewhere.").
96. BBC News, Robert Maxwell: A Profile, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
1249739.stm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005) (reporting on the mystery surrounding Max-
well's apparent suicide on November 5, 1991).
97. See Cadbury Report, supra note 92, at para. 2.2 (referring to "unexpected failures
of major companies"); see also Roger Cowe, Corporate Governance: The Stakeholder
Challenge, Report Issued by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
("A.C.C.A."), 2-3 (2001), available at http://www.accaglobal.com/pdfs/members-pdfs/
publications/90640 (describing the events surrounding the convening of the Cadbury
Committee). Roger Cowe is an author and business journalist in the UK, who regularly
contributes to The Guardian, the Financial Times, and several news magazines.
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Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, the London Stock Exchange,
and the Financial Reporting Council (which supervises accounting stan-
dards) set up the Cadbury Committee. 9 8 While its "remit" was to study the
finance and audit functions at Maxwell Communications and Polly Peck,
the Cadbury Committee went further in its recommendations, drawing
attention to the cozy boardroom atmosphere that had allowed these finan-
cial collapses to occur. In 1992, the Cadbury Committee issued recom-
mendations that were incorporated into a Code of Best Practice for
preserving auditor independence and enhancing the supervisory role of
the nonexecutive members of the board of directors. 99 These recommenda-
tions were also incorporated into the LSE's Listing Rules, colloquially
known as the Yellow Book. 100
2. Greenbury Committee
As the nineties progressed, the issue of executive pay became increas-
ingly controversial in Britain, particularly in newly privatized firms. 10 1 In
response, the Confederation of British Industry established the Greenbury
Committee to examine executive pay. 10 2 This Committee produced its
own code, 10 3 this one aimed at improving accountability in executive pay
by such strategies as stressing the role of nonexecutive directors in setting
executive compensation and casting a disapproving chill on such practices
as American-style stock options and "payment for failure" (executives with
long contracts being paid to leave early). 10 4 It also suggested, but did not
require, that top executives' and directors' annual pay increases be related
to the pay increases that employees generally were receiving in the com-
pany.l0 5 Finally, the Greenbury Committee emphasized the importance of
shareholder participation in the remuneration function and a "philosophy
of full transparency," including detailed disclosure of directors' remunera-
tion in annual reports. 10 6 This Code of Best Practice was also incorporated
98. Cadbury Report, supra note 92, at para. 2.1; see also Brian R. Cheffins, Current
Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 16-18 (1999) (providing more details on the circumstances under
which the commission was convened).
99. These included suggestions to separate the functions of the CEO and Chair of
the Board, and to establish audit and remuneration committees composed of non-execu-
tive directors. Cadbury Report, supra note 92, at para. 4.9.
100. Id. at 20.
101. Greenbury Report, supra note 92, at paras. 1.6-1.8, 8.1-8.4; see also Cowe, supra
note 97, at 3-4 (discussing the events leading to the establishment of the Greenbury
Committee).
102. Cheffins, supra note 98, at 20.
103. Greenbury Report, supra note 92, at 14-18 (section entitled "Code of Best Prac-
tices") [hereinafter Code of Best Practices]. The substantive portion of the Greenbury
Report has two sections: the "Code of Best Practices," which contains general principles,
and "Main Action Points," Greenbury Report, supra note 92, paras. 3.1-8.12 [hereinafter
Main Action Points], which elaborate on these principles.
104. Code of Best Practice, supra note 103, at paras. C8-C10; Main Action Points,
supra note 103, at para. 6.28-6.30
105. Code of Best Practice, supra note 103, at para. C3; Main Action Points, supra note
103, at para. 6.13.
106. Main Action Points, supra note 103, at para. 5.3.
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into the LSE's Listing Standards. 10 7
3. Hampel Committee
Both the Cadbury and Greenbury Comittees suggested that the impact
of their respective Codes of Best Practice be reviewed after some time had
passed,10 8 and the Hampel Committee was established to undertake that
review. 10 9 In 1998, the Hampel Committee issued its report, resulting in
the "Combined Code," t 0 which structured corporate governance in listed
companies until 2003, at which time a revised Combined Code was
issued.1 1 ' The Combined Code is a synthesis of the corporate governance
recommendations of Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel, and was promptly
added to the LSE's Yellow Book. 1 2 Moreover, the LSE added a new provi-
sion requiring companies to describe their corporate governance arrange-
ments in their annual reports in order to allow shareholders to determine if
the company's actions are in accordance with the Principles of Good Gov-
ernance, as well as to "comply or explain non-compliance" with the specific
provisions of the Code of Best Practice. 113 This "comply-or-explain" struc-
ture is still central to the Combined Code, as revised and reissued in July of
2003.114
The Hampel Committee's Report was significant for a number of rea-
sons, including its emphasis on risk management, discussed below, and its
encouragement of shareholder democracy. 1 15 The latter factor has led to
the increasing engagement of the British pension fund community with
companies on matters of financial performance, corporate governance, and
107. See Cowe, supra note 97, at 6.
108. Cadbury Report, supra note 92, at para. 1.4; Greenbury Report, supra note 92, at
para. 3.11.
109. Hampel Report, supra note 92, at 3.
110. The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice
(2000) (derived from the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports), available at http://www.
ecgi.org/codes/documents/combined-code.pdf [hereinafter 2000 Combined Code].
111. The Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003), available at http://www.
ecgi.org/codes/documents/combined-code-final.pdf [hereinafter 2003 Combined
Code]. The 2003 Combined Code incorporates the work of the Higgs Report, supra note
92, and Audit Committees: Combined Code Guidance (2003) [hereinafter Smith Review
of Audit Committees]. Both of these reviews were initiated after Enron, WorldCom, and
related problems occurred in the United States to immunize the UK against a similar
corporate governance contagion. See Jones & Pollitt, supra note 26, at 164.
112. Cheffins, supra note 98, at 22-23.
113. See 2003 Combined Code, supra note 111, at sched. C (Disclosure of Corporate
Governance Arrangements).
114. 2003 Combined Code, supra note 111, at pmbl. § 4.
115. Roger Cowe emphasizes the importance of the Hampel Committee's encourage-
ment of shareholder democracy in his report on behalf of the ACCA. Cowe, supra note
97, at 5, 11. Representatives of pension funds and institutional investors that we have
interviewed have also emphasized the importance of shareholder democracy, see, e.g.,
Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (2001) [hereinafter Myners
Review], in encouraging greater institutional investor engagement. For more on these
interviews, see infra note 226 and accompanying text.
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social and environmental concern. 116 The Cadbury Committee had recog-
nized that shareholder voting power is an asset that should be used to
improve corporate governance, and the Hampel Report emphasized that
point, encouraging pension funds and other institutional investors to
become more engaged in corporate governance by exercising voting rights
and by communicating with management on a range of issues. 117 In fact,
the 2003 Combined Code includes a section on shareholder democracy,
requiring "proxy votes to be counted and announced, separate votes to be
taken on key issues, chairmen of key board committees to be available to
answer questions, and [annual general meeting] papers to be sent to share-
holders four weeks ahead of the meeting."' 18
4. Turnbull Committee
The Hampel Committee's report also reiterated Cadbury's suggestion
that boards of directors should evaluate their companies' systems of inter-
nal control and risk management. 1 9 The Combined Code had established
as a Principle that boards should "maintain a sound system of internal
control," and implementing provisions suggested that directors review the
internal control system annually, covering "all controls, including finan-
cial, operational and compliance controls and risk management sys-
tems."'120 Implementing these concepts was left to yet another Committee,
the Turnbull Committee, which issued its report in 1999.121 Turnbull
broadened the corporate governance discussion in the UK by its explicit
recognition that an effective internal control system must address a wide
range of risks, including "legal, health, safety and environmental, reputa-
tion, and business probity issues."1 22 Turnbull thus excited the British
CSR community with the possibility of increased corporate and accounting
attention to these broader risks, and perhaps even mandatory expanded
social and environmental disclosure about them in the near term.
116. See generally Gordon L. Clark and Tessa Hebb, Pension Fund Corporate Engage-
ment: The Fifth Stage of Capitalism, 59 INDUS. REL. REv. 192 (2004), for a theoretical
analysis of the importance of this development. In particular, Clark and Hebb assert
that pension fund engagement could help overcome the separation of ownership from
control and encourage companies to operate in the long-term interest of their sharehold-
ers (and by implication pension fund beneficiaries), rather than being focused on short-
term results.
117. See Cowe, supra note 97, at 5. In 1998, the British National Association of Pen-
sion Funds studied shareholder voting and found that only 40 to 45% of shares were
typically voted at annual meetings. See id. at 12.
118. Cowe, supra note 97, at 5.
119. Hampel Report, supra note 92, at para. 6.10.
120. Code of Best Practice, supra note 103, at para. 6.21.
121. Turnbull Report, supra note 92. The substance of the Turnbull Report is
included in the 2003 Combined Code in a section entitled "Guidance on Internal Con-
trol (The Turnbull Guidance)." 2003 Combined Code, supra note 111, at 27-41.
122. See id. at 39 app.
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5. Company Law Review
Finally, in March of 1998, the Labour government launched an overall
review of the country's company law, the Company Law Review ("CLR"),
which is still ongoing as this Article is being written. 1 2 3 While part of that
review has focused on the technical aspects of modernizing and integrating
different aspects of company law, 1 24 a central issue in the Terms of Refer-
ence to the CLR Steering Group was the development of law that "protects
the interests of those involved with the enterprise, including shareholders,
creditors and employees." 125
a) CLR Steering Group
The first phase of the CLR thus required an examination of the corpo-
rate purpose, engendering a vigorous debate between the "pluralist" model
and the "enlightened shareholder value" view of the corporate purpose. 1 2 6
The pluralist model is essentially the stakeholder model. The enlightened
shareholder value model, however, goes significantly beyond the narrow
shareholder focus that is traditionally associated with the Anglo-American
view of the corporation. 12 7 Like the traditional model, the enlightened
view assumes that making profits for shareholders is the primary corporate
purpose. But it also asserts that a corporation's relationships with employ-
ees, customers, NGOs, creditors, and communities can affect its long-term
profitability, and therefore its shareholders' interests. In July of 2001, the
Company Law Review Steering Group issued its Final Report, which
adopted the enlightened shareholder model. 128 The Final Report recog-
nized that the primary purpose of the corporation is to create profits for
shareholders, but concluded that the time frame for assessing profit crea-
tion must be long-term, not short-term. 1 29 Moreover, the CLR Steering
Group concluded that long-term shareholder value is best achieved by
reducing a company's future social and environmental risk and enhancing
its reputation by "bearing in mind the rights and needs of players other
than shareholders.' 1 30
123. Corporate Law and Governance: Modernising Company Law, at http://www.dti.
gov.uk/cld/review.htm (last viewed Feb. 17, 2005). See also 1 Modern Company Law
for a Competitive Economy: Final Report (2001), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/
cld/final report/ [hereinafter Final Report] for CLR's preliminary recommendations
and questions, and Response to Modernising Company Law White Paper (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.dti.gov.uk/companiesbill/whitepaper.htm [hereinafter Government
Response] for the British government's reaction and response to the CLR's recommenda-
tions and questions.
124. The relevant issues include how to form a corporation, the different types of
corporations that can be formed, and the details of shareholder voting. Corporate Law
and Governance, supra note 123.
125. CLR Steering Group, Modernising Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
The Strategic Framework 10, (1999), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/comlawfw/
index.htm.
126. See Cowe, supra note 97, at 19-22.
127. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
128. See Final Report, supra note 123, at 5.
129. Id. at xvii.
130. Cowe, supra note 97, at 20; see also Final Report, supra note 123.
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Having settled on this enlightened shareholder view, the CLR Steering
Group then proposed a number of mechanisms to reinforce its conclusion
that companies need to be managed for the long term. One proposal was a
statutory formulation of directors' duties that would emphasize that direc-
tors must make decisions with due regard for long-term as well as short-
term consequences, and would recognize that a company's relationships
with its stakeholders affects the returns to shareholders. 13 1 Another pro-
posal was designed to meet the informational needs of long-term share-
holders. Here, the CLR Group recommended a revised Operating and
Financial Review ("OFR"). 13 2 The OFR is an annual report that has been
suggested as best practice since 1993 by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England & Wales, and a number of large companies have
been issuing OFRs for some years on a voluntary basis. 13 3 As currently
practiced, the OFR is an analysis of the company's business, strategic
objectives, and financial results. 134 The CLR Steering Group suggested
that all companies of "significant economic size" be required to prepare an
OFR as part of their Annual Report and Accounts, and that the OFR "pro-
vide a review of the business, its performance, plans and prospects, and
information the directors judge necessary for an understanding of the busi-
ness, such as relationships with employees, suppliers and customers, envi-
ronmental and community impact, corporate governance and management
of risk." 135
b) Government Response to the CLR Steering Group
In July 2002, the government published its response to the CLR Steer-
ing Group Final Report. 136 It reacted favorably to many of the CLR propos-
Our law should provide the maximum possible freedom combined with the
transparency necessary to ensure the responsible and accountable use of that
freedom .... [C]ompany law should reflect the reality of the modern corporate
economy, where those who run successful companies recognise the need to
develop positive relationships with a wide range of interests beyond sharehold-
ers-such as employees, suppliers and customers.
Final Report, supra note 123, at xi.
131. See Final Report, supra note 123, at xvii.
We recommend a statutory statement of directors' duties which will . ..
encourage responsible behaviour by making clear that in promoting the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, directors must take
account of long-term as well as short-term consequences; and that they must
recognise, where relevant, the importance of relations with employees, suppliers,
customers and others, the need to maintain a reputation for high standards of
business conduct, and the impact of their actions on the community and the
environment.
Id.
132. See id. at xix.
133. The Operating and Financial Review ("OFR") Working Group on Materiality: A
Consultation Document, 10 (2003), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/ofrwgcon.
pdf.
134. Id.
135. Final Report, supra note 123, at para. 8.32.
136. See Government Response, supra note 123.
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als, including the OFR initiative. 13 7 Throughout the UK's governance
review process, it has been emphasized that what needs to be disclosed
should be a matter for directors' informed judgment, that the categories of
information that should be disclosed would vary company to company,
and that there should be no incentive for directors to take a purely for-
mulaic, "tick-the-box" approach. Yet it has also been understood through-
out that directors need some guidance. The CLR Steering Group had
recommended that information concerning a company's products and
markets, acquisitions and disposals, purpose, strategy, and principal busi-
ness drivers always be included in the OFR. 138 It had also recommended
that information concerning a company's policy and performance on
social, ethical, environmental, and community relationships be included
"whenever the directors in good faith judge them 'material.' 139 Given this
dichotomy between categories of information, how the government ulti-
mately defined "materiality" would be critical to whether social, ethical,
and environmental information would be required to be disclosed.
c) OFR Working Group on Materiality
The government agreed with the logic of the CLR Steering Group, stat-
ing that it would propose laws to make the OFR mandatory and that it
would delegate power to a Standards Board to draw up detailed rules.
First, however, it would create an OFR Working Group on Materiality to
advise on how that concept should be defined. 140 The Terms of Reference
to the OFR Working Group on Materiality stated:
The Working Group will develop broad principles and practical guidance on
how directors can assess whether an item is material to their company and
hence whether it must be included in an OFR. This will include the com-
pany's impact on the environment and the wider community, but the same
broad approach to materiality is required across all the subject matter of the
OFR.14 1
The Working Group's Consultation Document on Materiality likely
gave comfort to the pluralists that their point of view had not been ignored.
Quite to the contrary, stakeholder thinking is woven in throughout. The
key concept, as stated by the Working Group, is that directors should ask,
"Does this item matter to the [shareholders], either directly, or indirectly as
a result of its significance to other stakeholders and thus to the
company?"'14
2
As expressed by the Working Group, its "starting point" was this:
[T]he view put forward in the [Company Law Review] that the primary role
of directors is to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its
shareholders as a whole but that this duty can only be discharged effectively
137. See id. passim.
138. See Final Report, supra note 123, at para. 8.32.
139. Id. at para. 8.40.
140. See Government Response, supra note 123, at xx.
141. The OFR Working Group on Materiality, supra note 133, at 6.
142. Id. at 15-16.
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when directors look at long term as well as short term issues and when all
the factors affecting the company's relationships and performance are taken
appropriately into account. This implies an appreciation of the implications
of a wide range of social and ethical, environmental and economic
impacts. 143
One of the criteria the Working Group used in developing its defini-
tion of materiality was "the importance of recognising who are the poten-
tial users of the OFR."'14 4 In addressing this criterion, the Working Group
recognized that while the CLR had adopted an enlightened shareholder
rather than broadly pluralist view of the corporate purpose, it is nonethe-
less true that "issues that are of significant interest to customers, to employ-
ees, to suppliers and to society more widely are, or will very likely become,
matters of concern to shareholders too."'
1 45
The Working Group then defined materiality as follows:
In making their good faith, honest judgements about what information is
material and should be included in their OFR, directors should be governed
by the high level objective of the OFR, which is to enable users to assess the
strategies adopted by the business and the potential for successfully achiev-
ing them. Information will be material to the OFR if failure to disclose it
clearly, fairly and unambiguously might reasonably be expected to influence
members' [shareholders'] assessments of the company and hence the deci-
sions they may take, either directly, or indirectly as a result of the signifi-
cance that the information has for other stakeholders and thus the company.
Information that is material to the OFR may be quantitative or qualitative;
and may relate to facts or probabilities, and to the past, present or future
events and decisions. 14 6
The Working Group emphasized three ideas that should guide direc-
tors in producing an OFR: the high-level objective of the OFR, which is to
enable users to evaluate the company's business strategies and likelihood
of achieving them; an understanding of the particular company's purpose
and values; and the need to take a broad view of the "approaches and per-
spectives that users of the OFR, in the first instance the members but also
other key stakeholders, will bring to their assessment."14 7 In explaining
this latter idea, the Working Group explained:
[Tlak[ingl a broad view about the approaches and perspectives that users of
the OFR. . . will bring to their assessments... implies taking a proactive
approach, including a willingness to consider society's changing norms and
expectations of business, and to explore and understand the agendas of a
range of different stakeholder groups that may reasonably be expected,
143. Id. at 11.
144. Id. at 6. Altogether, the Working Group used six criteria in developing its defini-
tion of materiality. In addition to the importance of recognizing who the potential users
are, it took into account the "desirability of building on existing guidance; the need to
recognise the context and the scope of the OFR; . . . the link between the OFR and
decision-taking; and the need to couch guidance in as clear and simple language as
possible." Id.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Id. at 18.
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directly or indirectly, to affect significantly the performance of the business,
including customers, employees, suppliers, and local, national and interna-
tional interest groups of a variety of kinds. Such groups can often not only
articulate the norms and expectations that society has of business but can
anticipate future changes in consumer behaviour and can influence regula-
tory change.
1 48
The Working Group also discussed the processes directors ought to
use to make their materiality determinations. It emphasized that, as a
result of the Turnbull Committee's report, directors likely had in place
processes to get the information necessary to manage the long-term risks
affecting their business, and that these processes probably included under-
standing the effects of decisions on key stakeholders such as employees,
consumers, customers, and communities. 14 9 Nonetheless, in a bold sug-
gestion, the Working Group proposed an additional step: that the process
for determining materiality should "provide for appropriate consultation
within the business and externally with key stakeholders."
150
d) The Government's Legislative Response to the OFR Working Group
on Materiality
On May 5, 2004, the UK government proposed OFR legislation that
fully adopted the Working Group's stakeholder-infused vision of enlight-
ened shareholder interest. It is worth quoting Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of
State for the Department of Trade and Industry, who introduced the legisla-
tion, at some length:
What are companies for? The primary goal is to make a profit for their share-
holders, certainly. But the days when that was the whole answer are long
gone. We all have higher expectations of companies not simply to perform
well in the short term, but to have an effective strategy for delivering long-
term profitability .... We save for the years ahead, not the months ahead,
and we need the companies in which we invest to share our own horizons.
We expect companies to generate the wealth that provides good public ser-
vices and a decent standard of living for everyone. We need continuing rec-
ognition that wealth creation demands honest and fair dealings with
employees, customers, suppliers and creditors. Good working conditions,
good products and services and successful relationships with a wide range
of other stakeholders are important assets, crucial to stable, long-term per-
formance and shareholder value.
We expect companies to create wealth while respecting the environment and
exercising responsibility towards the society and the local communities in
which they operate .... For this reason, I believe that increased, high quality
shareholder engagements is vital to creating the modern economy that we all
148. Id.
149. The OFR Working Group on Materiality, supra note 133, at 23.
150. Id. The government did not adopt this suggestion explicitly, but does require an
audit of the OFR to determine that the process used to make decisions as to what infor-
mation to include was adequate, and that there is an "adequate, supportable basis for
statements made, whether factual or judgemental[.]" Dep't of Trade & Indus., Draft
Regulations on the Operating and Financial Review and Directors' Report: A Consulta-
tive Document, para. 3.57, available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/pdfs/ofr-condoc.pdf.
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want.
15 1
Through the OFR, the government seeks to promote shareholder
engagement as the mechanism for bringing about the proper relationship
between the corporation and society. As it stated, "[i]t is through share-
holders exercising informed influence over companies that their expecta-
tions and those of the wider community will best be met."1 5 2 The
government's approach is premised on the belief that shareholders, when
presented with more comprehensive information, will conceive of the com-
pany's interests, and their own, in a more holistic way. As Secretary Hewitt
put the point, "[tihe people who invest in companies are the same people
who are employed by them, buy their products, live in the communities
around them, and are concerned about their effect on the environment. So
we have multiple reasons for wanting to see good companies."1 5 3 The "full
and accurate information" to be provided in the annual OFR is conceived,
then, as necessary to empower shareholders "to hold the directors of their
company to account for its performance." 15 4 This information "will cover
the issues traditionally seen as key to a company's performance-an
account of its business, objectives and strategy, a review of developments
over the past year, and a description of the main risks. But it will also cover
prospects for the future and, where necessary, information about the envi-
ronment, employees, customers or social and community issues where that
information is important for an assessment of the company."'1
55
In introducing the OFR Regulations, the government stated that such
disclosure should be a statutory requirement, not a matter of best practice,
and that it should be mandatory for the largest companies. 15 6 The govern-
ment also emphasized that it was "dovetailing" the OFR requirements with
certain requirements of the EU's Modernization Directive, 15 7 so that com-
panies which prepare an OFR would "not also have to report separately, in
their directors' report, on the matters specified in the Directive," particu-
larly since the Directive requirements are "less detailed and precise than
those recommended for the OFR."'1 58 Because the Modernization Directive
gives countries the option to exempt medium-sized companies from its
nonfinancial reporting requirements, the "main issue on which the [UK]
Government is consulting" is its proposal to create such an exemption in
the OFR. 159
151. Dep't of Trade & Indus., supra note 150, at 5-6.
152. Id. at 12, para. 2.3.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at para. 1.4.
157. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
158. Dep't of Trade & Indus., supra note 150, at para. 1.5.
159. Id. at para. 1.5. The UK defines a company as medium-sized if two or more of
the following requirements are met in a year: "Turnover: not more than £22.8 million;
Balance sheet total: not more than £11.4 million; Number of employees: not more than
250." Id. at para. 2.12.
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That the OFR is shareholder-oriented is clear throughout the draft reg-
ulations: the government recognizes that the OFR will be produced for
shareholders, and will allow shareholders to assess a company's strategies
and its likelihood of success. 160 Yet the government also recognizes that
the OFR will be relevant to other users, including creditors and "other
stakeholders ... including employees," 16 1 and it articulated the following
goals:
improved qualitative, nonfinancial and forward-looking reporting on the
performance of the company, and
directors deciding in good faith what would be most likely to promote the
success of the company, taking account of a wide range of factors, within
and outside the company, which are relevant to achieving its objectives
and to an assessment of its business. These factors may well include the
company's impact on the environment and on the wider community, and
its relationships with employees, customers and suppliers.
162
The draft regulations, as introduced, maintain the bifurcated structure
of the CLR and Working Group on Materiality proposals. Strategic busi-
ness issues are presumed to be material, and so should always be reported
upon. 16 3 Other "details of particular matters" must be included to the
extent necessary to provide the "balanced and comprehensive analysis"
with respect to the company's position, performance, and strategic devel-
opment that the OFR seeks to promote. 16 4 Significantly, these "particular
matters" include information about "(a) the employees of the company and
its subsidiary undertakings, (b) environmental matters, and (c) social and
community issues," and require "analysis using financial and other key
performance indicators, including information relating to environmental
matters and employee matters."16 5 The draft regulations also require audi-
tors to opine on the OFR, including "whether in their opinion the directors
have prepared the review after due and careful enquiry."'1 6 6
In its introduction of the draft regulations, the government gave a
number of examples of types of issues directors might determine to be
160. See id. at paras. 2.4, 3.5, 3.7 (asserting that "[t]he draft Regulations are designed
to transform the CLR objective into a legislative requirement that results in useful, honest
reporting of information that will allow shareholders to assess the company's strategies
and their potential to succeed and is consistent with EU requirements").
161. Id. at para. 2.4.
162. See id. at para. 2.5.
163. See id. at 40, annex A, para. 7(1), (2) (proposing to amend the 1985 Companies
Act to include Schedule 7ZA). The required matters include a statement of the com-
pany's business, objectives, strategic thinking, and future prospects; a description of the
resources available to the company; the main trends and factors affecting the company's
performance over the prior year and future prospects, including risks and uncertainties;
and information on the company's financial performance, including capital structure,
treasury policies, and liquidity. Id.
164. Id. at 40, annex A, para. 7(4)-(7).
165. Id. at 40, annex A, para. 7(4), (6)(1). The draft OFR regulations define "key
performance indicators" as "[t]he factors by reference to which the development, per-
formance or position of the business of the company and its subsidiary undertakings
can be measured most effectively." Id. at 40, annex A, para. 7(6)(2).
166. Id. at 40, annex A, para. 7(8)(a).
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material in the OFR "both where they constitute a significant external risk
to the company, and where the company's impact on others through its
activities, products or services, affects its performance."' 16 7 These exam-
ples included:
an explanation of risk management approaches employed by a company
that stores, transports or uses significant volumes of hazardous or toxic
substances that risk damaging the health of workers or others, or pollut-
ing the environment or;
how a company that is a heavy user of natural resources, which may
become scarce or the price of which may change significantly, is
intending to reduce its dependency on such resources;
how a company that may be susceptible to the impacts of climate change
plans to mitigate the risks and take advantage of the opportunities
presented by a changing climate;
current and likely future compliance record for companies operationally
dependent upon legal consents for discharges to air, land or water;
an explanation of the risk management approaches employed by a com-
pany to assess the operational impact on biodiversity where failure to
avoid or mitigate damage would put development consents at risk. 168
The draft OFR regulations and the EU Modernization Directive use
parallel language and require parallel information: "key performance
indicators" concerning environmental, social, and employee matters "to the
extent necessary" to provide an informed understanding of the company's
strategic development, performance, current position, and future risks and
uncertainties. Both seek a "fair" (EU) or "balanced and comprehensive"
(UK) analysis of the directors' views on the environmental and social mat-
ters that are likely to have an effect on the company. The LSE is of major
importance in the world of cross-border equity trading, and the European
Modernization Directive will obviously affect companies' nonfinancial
reporting throughout Europe. Thus, taken together, the requirements of
the OFR and of the European Modernization Directive, if well imple-
mented, will have the effect of requiring many large companies to produce
more social and environmental information, potentially leading to more
sustained thinking about stakeholders' interests. Moreover, from the per-
spective of the UK, the company law process and OFR requirements sug-
gest a subtle but significant shift away from the United States model of
corporate governance in a more European direction. 169 This point will be
167. Id. at 23, para. 3.33.
168. Id.
169. These developments can also be interpreted as an ongoing experiment in "new
governance" or "the new governing paradigm." See COLIN SCOTT, REGULATION IN THE AGE
OF GOVERNANCE: THE RISE OF THE POsT-REGULATORY STATE 5 (Nat'l Eur. Ctr., Austl. Nat'l
Univ., Paper No. 100, 2003), available at http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/scottl.pdf. New
governance theory is complex, its terminology and taxonomies contested, and its theo-
retical framework still inchoate. However, a core element in virtually all formulations is
the idea of the "postregulatory state." The essence of this idea is captured in the linguis-
tic shift from government to governance. Regulatory power is diffused progressively
among networks of state and nonstate actors that transcend national boundaries. See id.
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developed in much greater detail in Part III of this Article.
C. The United States
In contrast to Europe and the UK, in the United States the require-
ments for companies to disclose nonfinancial information are limited, and
there are no overarching government policies favoring sustainable develop-
ment. Discussions of CSR, or at least of "corporate responsibility," have
reemerged in the United States in the post-Enron era, but, again in contrast
to Europe and the UK, these discussions have tended to be narrowly cir-
cumscribed. As used in the press and in the recent outpouring of govern-
ment and regulatory action, the term corporate responsibility, social or
otherwise, has referred almost exclusively to the obligations of companies
to report their financial results accurately and reduce conflicts of interest;
and also to lawyers', accountants', and securities analysts' responsibilities
for the accuracy of information used by the capital markets. 170 While it is
refreshing to hear the words "corporate" and "responsibility" in the same
sentence in polite company, the primary results of the "corporate responsi-
bility" debacle in the United States have been that Congress, the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and the NYSE have tried to encourage
companies to produce accurate financial statements-something they have
been required to do by law for over seventy years-and to encourage
accounting firms to do the job they are paid to do. Thus, the responsibility
discussion in the United States to date has had the ironic effect of doing
little more than further entrenching the idea of shareholder primacy.
Notwithstanding the narrowness of the corporate responsibility dis-
cussion in the United States, there are some requirements under federal
securities law for companies to disclose environmental and, perhaps, social
information. These requirements may have been given new emphasis by
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In the discussion that fol-
lows, we will first describe the aspects of federal securities law that call for
the disclosure of environmental' 71 or social information and then suggest
at 2-4. Professor Ann-Marie Slaughter has emphasized the prominence of networks in
the postregulatory "pluralist mix of global governance mechanisms." Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated
Democracy, 24 MicH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1044 (2003). These include many forms of "trans-
governmental" networks, defined as interactions among subunits of governments that
are not closely controlled by their respective legislatures or executives. Id. at 1045.
Importantly, "transgovernmental networks" can be folded into larger "mixed networks"
of governmental and private actors." Id. at 1057. In the case of the EU countries, gov-
ernmental actors have participated, with the effect of triggering policy convergence. Id.
The fact that CSR has yet to become part of U.S. regulatory policy may be a reflection
less of differing ideologies than of the fact that network governance is far better devel-
oped within the EU than in this country. In fact, it has been widely argued that such
governance-sometimes labeled "comitology"-is the very essence of the EU. See id. at
1058-62 (reviewing comitology scholarship).
170. NGOs, labor, and some business organizations use the term "corporate social
responsibility" in a more encompassing sense.
171. Companies are also required to disclose environmental information under the
federal Toxic Release Inventory ("T.R.I."), which requires companies to list their releases
of specific toxins into the air and water, facility by facility. See Toxic Release Inventory
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ways in which Sarbanes-Oxley might have an impact on such disclosure.
We conclude the section by describing some recent legal developments in
proxy regulation that have the potential to bring stakeholder interests more
directly into the corporate governance relationship in the United States.
1. Required Environmental or Social Disclosure
A public reporting company's obligation to disclose environmental
information under the federal securities laws is based on three sections of
Regulation S-K: Items 101, 103, and 303.172 Item 101(xiii) requires com-
panies to disclose the costs of coming into compliance with new environ-
mental regulations, either local, state, or federal. 17 3 Item 103 requires
companies to discuss pending litigation, with special provisions forcing
disclosure of pending environmental litigation wherever the litigation is
brought by a government agency and the potential penalties are $100,000
or more.1 74 Item 303, called "Management Discussion and Analysis," is a
general obligation for companies to discuss their financial and operational
results, and to disclose any known "events, trends, or contingencies" that
might have a material financial impact in the future. 175 This item could,
therefore, call for the disclosure of either social or environmental informa-
tion depending on the circumstances. For instance, an extractive company
could be required to disclose information about social and political insta-
bility in Indonesia that might shut down production; or a manufacturing
company could be required to disclose information about toxic waste
cleanup costs upon being identified as a potentially responsible party
under Superfund legislation. 176
While this combination of requirements could, in theory, serve to
cause companies to disclose a considerable amount of social and environ-
mental information, they do not operate that way in practice. The World
Program, at http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last updated Feb. 23, 2005). T.R.I. has been an
important impetus toward improved environmental quality. The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency credits T.R.I. with declines of 55% in releases to the air between 1988 and
1997; declines in water releases of 63%; and declines in underground injection and on-
site disposal of over 20%, while off-site disposal declined only 1%. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Innovation at the Environmental Protection Agency: A Decade of
Progress, 33-35 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/opei/decade/decade.pdf.
Since the data is presented facility by facility, rather than aggregated at a company level,
this information is not as useful in comparing different companies' environmental
approaches and potential litigation exposure as is securities' disclosure, which has com-
parability as one goal.
172. Since 1982, disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") has been integrated, such that
information disclosed in quarterly or annual reports pursuant to the Exchange Act can
be incorporated by reference into offering documents under the Securities Act. See
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No.
18524, 24 SEC Docket 1262, 1262, 1300 (Mar. 3, 1982). Regulation S-K is the omnibus
regulation that sets out the specific information that is to be disclosed in any document
required to be produced under either statute.
173. Reg. S-K, Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1998).
174. Reg. S-K, Item 103, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1998).
175. Reg. S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1998).
176. Superfund legislation is codified at 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675 (1994).
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Resources Institute has performed several studies that show that disclosure
of regulatory impact under Item 101(xiii) tends to be utterly uninforma-
tive. 17 7 In general, the companies were eager to downplay any competitive
disadvantage and thus failed to provide meaningful financial disclosure or
analysis of the likely impact of new environmental regulations. Many
relied on boilerplate statements that they expected no material impact, or,
if there would be a material impact, that all industry participants were sim-
ilarly situated, which was, in fact, not true.1 78
Similarly, in 1998 the EPA did a study of companies' disclosure of
their environmental litigation under Item 103, which provides a bright-line
rule for when such disclosure is necessary. The EPA found that 74% of
reporting companies were flagrantly violating Item 103.179 Using a
database of legal proceedings in 1996 and 1997, which it developed from
its enforcement docket, the EPA found that only 26% of 136 defendants
mentioned legal proceedings that were required to be disclosed, and of
these, only 3% correctly identified both the statute under which they were
potentially liable and the amount of the potential penalty. 180 Yet, the SEC
has brought only one enforcement action in twenty years with respect to
this aspect of Item 103.181 While this lack of enforcement may be under-
standable in light of the other pressing disclosure issues the SEC must
address, the point for this analysis is that, to date, Item 103 has not had the
effect of forcing the disclosure of accurate information about companies'
environmental litigation into the market, undermining the stakeholder
influence that this Item could otherwise promote.
Finally, Item 303 (Management Discussion and Analysis), if broadly
interpreted, could force much social and environmental information into
the market. The SEC has given companies guidance on how to apply Item
303, suggesting a two-step process of (1) determining if a known event,
trend, or contingency is likely to "mature" into having an actual effect on
the company and (2) if the company cannot rule out the occurrence of the
event, trend, or contingency, evaluating the potential financial impact on
the assumption that it will occur. 182 Therefore, a wide range of business
177. See Robert Repetto & Duncan Austin, World Resources Institute, Coming Clean:
Corporate Disclosure of Financially Significant Environmental Risks (2000); Duncan
Austin & Amanda Sauer, World Resources Institute, Changing Oil: Emerging Environ-
mental Risks and Shareholder Value in the Oil and Gas Industry (2003).
178. Repetto & Austin, supra note 177, at 24.
179. See David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The
Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BAIT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 202
(2004).
180. See Nicholas C. Franco, Corporate Environmental Disclosure: Opportunities To
Harness Market Forces To Improve Corporate Environmental Performance 15 tbls.2-3
(2001) (delivered to the American Bar Association Section on the Environment, Energy,
and Resources, copy on file with authors).
181. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century:
Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 AIA. L. REV. 775, 813 (2004).
182. See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations: Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No.
6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 (May 24, 1989).
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risks are apparently required to be disclosed under this regulation. In
practice, however, a majority of public reporting companies in the United
States have not taken such a broad approach to their disclosure obligations
under Item 303.183
It is possible that some of these trends of nondisclosure may change in
light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the statute passed in reaction to
the Enron and WorldCom corporate governance failures. Sarbanes-Oxley
requires both the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of a pub-
lic reporting company to certify that the financial statements are accurate
and that they have evaluated the effectiveness of their internal control sys-
tems and have confidence in them. 184 Another part of Sarbanes-Oxley
requires annual disclosure of how the effectiveness of internal controls has
been determined. 185 These provisions might cause companies and their
accountants to disclose more information about contingent environmental
liabilities and to disclose more information about a company's internal
controls with respect to contingent liabilities, including environmental lia-
bilities. But even this level of disclosure would be modest in comparison
with either the new European or pending UK requirements.
2. Proxy Voting and Stakeholder Concerns
Despite the apparent weakness of the existing disclosure rules, there
are pressures that may have the effect of introducing stakeholder concerns
more directly into the American corporate governance system, albeit
stealthily. One important enactment is contained in the new SEC Rules
and Forms (effective August 2003) requiring mutual funds (and registered
investment advisers, based on companion Rules) to disclose the policies
and procedures that they use to determine how to vote proxies for portfolio
securities. As of April 14, 2004, these Rules require these same entities to
disclose annually how the fund or adviser actually voted proxies for each
company in its portfolio.' 8 6
183. See Repetto & Austin, supra note 177, at 5-6; Michelle Chan-Fishel, Friends of
the Earth, Third Survey of Climate Change Disclosure in SEC Filings of Automobile,
Insurance, Oil and Gas, Petrochemical, and Utilities Companies 3 (2004) (finding that
39% of reporting companies discussed climate change, with wide variation among
industries (90% in utilities versus 11% in insurance), and that European companies
report at much higher rates than American companies). The Friends of the Earth survey
also found wide variations in the quality of disclosure, even among companies that dis-
cussed climate change, with very few issuers providing quantitative estimates of the
potential impacts of climate change, or providing other specifics. See id. Another recent
report on Management's Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A") disclosure, this one focus-
ing on the mining industry, similarly found that known material environmental risks
were routinely not disclosed. See Robert Repetto, Silence Is Golden, Leaden, and Cop-
per: Disclosure of Material Environmental Information in the Hard Rock Mining Indus-
try 2 (2004), available at http://www.yale.edu/environment/downloads/repettojreport_
full.pdf.
184. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2004).
185. Id. § 7262.
186. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Man-
agement Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release
No. 47,304, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Jan. 31, 2003).
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The clear intent of these new requirements is to allow shareholders to
monitor their funds' involvement in the corporate governance process by
requiring transparency with respect to how voting power is being exer-
cised. This transparency may prove to be particularly important in
allowing shareholders to monitor formerly undisclosed conflicts of interest
between a mutual fund's managers and its investors.'8 7 Such a conflict
can exist when, for instance, a fund's investment adviser also manages or
seeks to manage the retirement plan assets of a company whose securities
are held by the fund.' 88 It has been argued that these kinds of conflicts of
interest are a major constraint on institutional shareholders' engagement in
corporate governance issues.18 9 The new proxy voting disclosure rule may
mitigate this constraint by pressuring mutual fund managers to vote prox-
ies in their shareholders' interests, rather than in the interests of the man-
agers of portfolio companies whose business they seek.
The impact of these new requirements may even go beyond reducing
mutual fund conflicts of interest. The rule was proposed in response to
rulemaking petitions brought by labor groups (the AFL-CIO and the Team-
sters) and by the Domini Social Investment Fund, a prominent SRI mutual
fund. 190 Proxy voting disclosure was opposed, quite vigorously, by large
institutional investors such as Fidelity, Magellan, and TIAA-CREF,
although these funds supported disclosure of a mutual fund's general
proxy voting policies. 19 1 Previous SEC proposals (in 1971 and 1978) to
require mutual fund proxy voting disclosure had been withdrawn in favor
of SEC encouragement of voluntary proxy voting disclosure (in 1980 and
1992), an effort that enjoyed only limited success. 19 2 The fact that the SEC
promulgated this proxy voting disclosure rule in 2003 at the urging of cer-
tain shareholders-labor and SRI investors-over the objections of more
"mainstream" institutional shareholders could be evidence of the SEC's rec-
ognition that "shareholders" are not unidimensional, that some sharehold-
ers are interested in the social and environmental implications of their
187. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financial
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE LJ. 269, 281 n.40 (2003).
188. See id. at 281-82 (describing pension fund management conflicts of interest and
other types of conflicts of interest). As one example, the Fidelity family of funds, which
is the largest fund family in the United States, is said to have earned more than half of its
$9.8 billion operating revenues in 2001 by providing fee-based services to companies at
which it voted proxies on behalf of fund investors. Id. at 279; see also Securities Act
Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6564-65 (empha-
sizing the economic significance of mutual funds). Without proxy voting disclosure, it
is unlikely that Fidelity (or any other mutual fund) would vote contrary to manage-
ment's interests on corporate governance proposals at companies from which it earns
significant fees, even if such votes would otherwise be in its shareholders' interests. See
id. at 6464.
189. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811, 816-19 (1992).
190. Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 6567 n.24.
191. See id. at 6565, 6567.
192. See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Disclose?, 23
CARDOZO L. REv. 1419, 1454-62 (2002).
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investments, and that those shareholders, even if a minority, have a right to
know how their mutual funds vote.193
Moreover, required disclosure is likely to have implications for devel-
opments in proxy voting that have become evident in the last two years.
During that period, there has been a seeming convergence of voting pat-
terns between some conventional corporate governance activists and SRI
shareholder activists. The immediate impact of the convergence can be
seen in proxy voting statistics. During the 2003 proxy season, many cor-
porate governance shareholder proposals achieved majority votes, includ-
ing initiatives to eliminate staggered boards, to separate the CEO from the
chairman of the board, and to limit executive pay.194 Social and environ-
mental proposals are also getting higher than usual levels of support. Aver-
age support for social and environmental proposals in 2002 was 9.4%, the
highest level in ten years, and about one in seven proposals got at least 15%
support. 19 5 At the same time, some social and environmental shareholder
proposals achieved votes in the 20 to 40% range-levels of shareholder con-
cern that one assumes firm managers will not reflexively ignore. 1 96
193. See Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, 68 Fed
.Reg. at 6568. A recent shareholder resolution seeking to persuade the Teachers Insur-
ance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund ("TIAA-CREF") to dis-
close its proxy votes on social and environmental proposals got "significant support"
from fund shareholders (18.7% of shares voted). Id. The SEC discussed this example in
promulgating its proxy disclosure rules, stating that "regardless of whether all, or a
majority of, investors are interested in proxy voting disclosure, we believe that fund
shareholders who are interested in this information have a fundamental right to know
how the fund has exercised its proxy votes on their behalf." Id.
194. A report on resolutions on CEO compensation and staggered boards issued by
the Investor Responsibility Research Center ("IRRC") indicates that a majority of resolu-
tions on these two subjects received majority votes in the 2003 proxy season. CEO Com-
pensation/Golden Parachutes, at www.irrc.org/company/ceo-comp.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005); Classified Boards, at www.irrc.org/company/classified.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005).
195. See Press Release, Social Investment Forum, Report: 2003 Proxy Season
Expected To Set Records, with CEO Pay and Global Warming Among Top Issues (Feb.
12, 2003), available at http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/news/030212_sanlproxy.htm.
The very narrow range between the average (9.4%) and the high level (over 15%) of
support for social and environmental proposals (in statistical terms, a small standard
deviation) suggests that most positive votes on social proposals are coming from about
the same coalition of SRI funds and activist public pension funds.
196. See Press Release, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility ("I.C.C.R."), Top
Vote-Getting Resolutions of 2002 (Aug. 16, 2002), available at http://www.iccr.org/
news/pressreleases/art-topvotes02.htm (stating that 36.8% of votes cast in Hudson
Bay's 2002 proxy supported adopting an I.L.O. code of conduct, and that in 32.8% of
votes cast in Unocal's 2002 proxy supported implementing an employee policy based on
I.L.O. principles). In addition, several climate change resolutions put to vote in the 2003
proxy season have garnered over twenty percent. Thus, 32% of Chevron Texaco's shares
and 21% of Exxon Mobil's shares were voted in favor of a resolution calling for the
development of renewable energy alternatives; and 26.9% of American Electric Power's
shares, 24.2% of TXU's shares, 22.6% of General Electric's shares, and 22% of Exxon
Mobil's shares were voted in favor of reporting on greenhouse gas emissions or global
climate change risks. Press Release, IRRC, Global Warming (May 19, 2003), available at
http://wvw.irrc.org/company/global.html. Other notable votes on resolutions concern-
ing social or environmental concerns include 44.3% of Cooper Industries' shares voted
in favor of a proposal to issue a sustainability report, and 42.8% of Dover Corporation's
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Another result of disclosure of mutual fund and investment advisers'
proxy voting records may be to permit organized labor to exert greater pres-
sure on portfolio companies' management to take social and environmen-
tal issues seriously. If union pension fund managers' voting records are
more transparent to their union beneficiaries, the percentage of votes for
social and environmental initiatives that organized labor favors will pre-
sumably increase. According to the AFL-CIO, union and other worker-
based pension, health, and savings funds represent $6 trillion in capital
markets investment. 19 7 Analysis of the kinds of shareholder proposals that
labor has brought forward shows them to be overwhelmingly concerned
with corporate governance, 198 and the AFL-CIO has continued to empha-
size corporate governance concerns such as executive compensation, board
independence, and board accountability. Nonetheless, the AFL-CIO's
proxy voting guidelines also emphasize that workers' funds should be
invested in companies that support working families and their communi-
ties and that are aligned with a long-term view of sustainable value.19 9
Moreover, those same guidelines suggest that fund managers should gener-
ally vote to support shareholder proposals that require adherence to Inter-
national Labor Organization ("I.L.O.") principles; call for monitoring and
reporting on domestic and global labor practices; or seek better environ-
mental stewardship, reduced greenhouse emissions, and the like. Given
labor's stake in the market, a concerted effort to demand fidelity to these
principles, with voting transparency to allow monitoring of that fidelity,
could increase the pressure on corporate management to take stakeholder
concerns more seriously.
Developments such as these may or may not portend a shift in the
American model of the primacy of shareholder value. On the one hand,
the pressures just described are likely to enhance the ability of non-
shareholder constituencies to influence U.S.-based global companies. On
the other hand, however, the vehicle through which this influence will be
exerted is eminently traditional: informed voting by a company's owners.
Perhaps the fairest reading of what is happening is that shareholders are
being given the opportunity to define shareholder value to include stake-
holder concerns. Shareholders might take up this invitation for either of
two reasons: because they believe that stakeholder issues really are eco-
nomic at their core, or because they choose to use their voting power to
pursue noneconomic ends. In either case, the result may be the same:
shares voted in favor of a proposal to adopt a policy against discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 1.C.C.R., Companies, Resolutions, and Status: 2002-2003 Season, at
http://www.iccr.org/news/press-releases/pr-dover.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
197. See AFL-CIO President John Sweeney Demands Corporate Reform, Announces
Action Plan, at http://www.aflcio.org/corporateamerica/ns07302002.cfm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).
198. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018, 1045-46 (1998).
199. See Exercising Authority, Restoring Accountability: AFL-CIO Proxy Voting
Guidelines (2003), available at www.aflcio.org/corporateamerica/capital/upload/proxy
-voting-guidelines.
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some increased pressures on American corporate managers to converge on
the European model of thinking about stakeholders without any funda-
mental restructuring of the American governance model.
II. Implications: England as a Special Corporate Governance Case
On many corporate governance issues the United States and the UK
remain similar to each other, and distinct from Europe (or Japan). Accord-
ingly, it still makes sense for some purposes to refer to an Anglo-American
corporate model. Both countries are understood to exhibit a "shareholder"
form of capitalism, under which the purpose of the corporation is to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth. 200 As noted above, the United States and the UK
continue to share a pattern of dispersed share ownership; have well-devel-
oped securities markets; and depend upon similar mechanisms to promote
managerial accountability, including financial transparency, stock market
valuations, and (at least in theory) the market for corporate control.20 1
And despite some differences, in both countries stock ownership has
become increasingly concentrated in institutions such as mutual funds or
pension funds.
Notwithstanding these structural similarities, the details of share-
holder capitalism in the United States and the UK are different, and likely
to become more so as firms in the UK are pressed to diverge from the
American model by a variety of forces at work in Britain and the
Europe 2 0 2 -forces that are presently either nonexistent or much weaker in
the United States. These forces include actions by such public institutions
as the governments of the EU and the UK and a variety of private actors.
The latter include pension funds, insurance companies, and other institu-
tional investors, as well as the fund managers that advise them; NGOs;
labor unions; and consumers. We will consider the impact of these factors
in turn.20 3
A. Government Influences
1. The EU
Through its Modernization Directive, the EU is requiring large compa-
nies throughout Europe (including, of course, the UK) to engage in a very
general version of sustainability reporting. 20 4 This requirement is not
200. See Cheffins, supra note 22, 498-506 for an overview of the divide between
shareholders and stakeholders.
201. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for caveats about relying on the market
for corporate control as a corporate accountability mechanism.
202. See Armour et al., supra note 12, at 541-49.
203. Space constraints preclude us from closely describing the important impact of
NGOs (or labor unions) on the corporate governance divergence that we are examining
here. We look more carefully at the role of NGOs in Engage, Embed and Embellish: The
Theory and Practice of Corporate Social Responsibility, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=691521.
204. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the overarching EU sustainability
reporting requirement in comparison to national developments regarding sustainability
reporting within EU member states, but it would be interesting to see the extent to which
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nearly as specific as that imposed by French Article 116,205 but it seems
likely that the process will continue to evolve in the direction of more, and
not less, sustainability reporting. Since the Modernization Directive came
after the UK was already embarked on the Company Law Review process
and was already seriously considering expanded nonfinancial disclosure
in the OFR, its main import in Britain is not the fact of the enactment itself,
but rather as an example of a more general point. That is, as a member of
the EU, the UK will certainly be more strongly influenced by European
approaches to corporate governance than the United States will be. While
this is a reciprocal process, 20 6 the UK will have to conform to the more
stakeholder-oriented views of other EU Member States to the extent such
views become part of EU directives. The potential for reciprocity is evident
in the controversial Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers. Because of the
influence of individual Member States, its final version was less share-
holder-centric than originally proposed by the EU's High Level Group of
Company Law Experts (requiring employee consultation, for example), but
it also provided for more shareholder power to effect hostile bids than
exists in most EU states. 20 7 EU employment law has also brought stake-
holder thinking to the UK in the form of requirements for employee consul-
tation in connection with mergers, large-scale layoffs, or insolvencies. 20 8
While it is impossible to predict exactly where the equilibrium between the
UK and the EU will be reached, we expect the EU to exert the stronger
gravitational influence, ultimately leading the UK to a significantly greater
recognition of stakeholder influence than the United States.20 9
2. The UK Government
a) Corporate Governance
Of probably greater importance, the UK government has been more
active over the last decade than its American counterpart on such issues as
board structure and independence, financial reporting, executive compen-
sation, and shareholders' rights, and, more recently, companies' social, eth-
Europe is developing a distinctly European approach to such reporting, as opposed to
different states' approaches.
205. The environmental component is quite specific, though, by virtue of the May 30,
2001, EU Recommendation on the Recognition, Measurement, and Disclosure of Envi-
ronmental Issues in Annual Reports and Financial Accounts. See supra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text.
206. See generally Barnard et al., supra note 13, for a discussion of the reciprocal
influence dynamic. They discuss the particular example of the UK's influence on the
EU on the matter of labor flexibility. Id. at 462-69.
207. See id. at 471-73.
208. See Armour et al., supra note 12, at 541-44 (discussing the influence of EU labor
policy on the UK).
209. Where this equilibrium will be reached will also depend on the differing influ-
ences of the individual EU member states on issues of companies' social and environ-
mental responsibilities, since we are reminded by readers from Europe that there are few
areas on which there is a unified "European" perspective-that the Danish view on the
environment or labor partnerships is different from the Spanish or Hungarian, and so
on.
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ical, and environmental responsibilities and reporting. This may be partly
attributable to the fact that the UK had a head start on the United States in
reevaluating core aspects of corporate governance, since their "Enron
equivalent" (the Maxwell and Polly Peck debacles) 2 10 occurred in 1991, not
2002. Another important difference between the two countries is that in
the UK the corporate governance inquiry and development of best practice
are consolidated at the national level, rather than being split between the
states and the federal government as here. Delaware exerts disproportion-
ate influence over state corporate law in the United States, so as a practical
matter, state power is not divided fifty ways. Nonetheless, Delaware's com-
mon law contribution to corporate governance reform is not as systematic
as the UK's committee process has been, nor has the federal government in
the United States been explicitly involved in regulating corporate govern-
ance until recently.
Whether as a consequence of these factors or as a combination of
these and other factors, on a number of corporate governance issues com-
panies in the UK have diverged from United States' practice over the past
decade. 21 1 For instance, 90% of the UK's largest companies split the role
of CEO and Chairman,2 12 as recommended by the Cadbury Committee,
versus only 19% of a comparable group of United States' companies. 2 1
3
Differences can be seen in the levels and composition of executive compen-
sation as well, although the trends here are towards convergence on a more
American model, both in the UK and throughout Europe. 2 14 Average exec-
utive (CEO) compensation in the United States is still twice that in the UK,
even though pay levels in the UK (as throughout Europe) are rising.2 15
210. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
211. For a somewhat informal discussion of differences between UK and U.S.
approaches to corporate governance, see Jack Keenan, Corporate Governance in UK/USA
Boardrooms, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 172 (Apr. 2004).
212. See Higgs Report, supra note 92, at para. 5.3.
There is already a high level of compliance with the Code's provision to separate
the roles of chairman and chief executive, recommended by Cadbury a decade
ago. Around 90 per cent of listed companies now split these roles. Separation
of the roles of chairman and chief executive is one of the strengths of the UK
corporate governance regime.
Id. The Higgs Report was commissioned in 2002 to evaluate the adequacy of the UK
corporate governance regime in light of Enron and similar failures in the United States,
and in order to continue to reevaluate UK corporate governance post-Cadbury, in partic-
ular given the sustained drop in share values between 2000 and 2002. See id. at paras.
1.2-1.3.
213. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance, Culture, and Convergence: Corpo-
rations American Style or with a European Touch?, 9 LAw & Bus. REv. AMs. 33, 56 (2003)
(citing statistics showing that, in 2001, only 19% of U.S. S&P 500 companies separated
the positions of CEO and Chairman, as compared to 100% of Germany's DAX 30 and
100% of Holland's top eleven companies); see also Higgs Report, supra note 92, at 16,
para. 2.9.
214. See Cheffins, supra note 22, at 506-09 (discussing statistics on the United
States, UK, and Germany on executive pay).
215. See Brian R. Cheffins, Will Executive Pay Globalise Along American Lines?, 11
CoRP. Gov. 8, 9 (2003). In fact, Professor Cheffins has noted that "je]mpirical studies
lend support to the proposition that 'if you averaged out US pay and German pay, you
would probably come out close to current UK pay levels for chief execs."' Cheffins, The
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Moreover, the long-term "incentivised" portion of CEO pay (long-term
incentive plans and stock options), which is a corporate governance mea-
sure designed to align the interests of top managers and shareholders, con-
stitutes 161% of the average U.S. CEO's salary, versus only 44% in the
UK.
2 1 6
b) Corporate Social Responsibility
In addition to the UK government's concentrated attention to corpo-
rate governance, it has also offered strong support for bringing social, envi-
ronmental, and ethical concerns into the discussion of corporate law and
obligation. Comparing CSR developments in the UK, EU, and United
States, one pair of researchers concluded that "[miore than any nation we
studied, Great Britain has developed policies and incentives, asked for pub-
lic feedback and communicated to citizens that responsible global corpo-
rate behavior is imperative. ''217 This attention to social, environmental,
and ethical concerns clearly informed the OFR process and outcome, but
other government initiatives have also been important in encouraging
stakeholder thinking by corporate directors and managers. These initia-
tives have included both regulatory actions, active encouragement of volun-
tary initiatives, and public-private partnerships.
One new law of particular significance is an amendment to the Occu-
pational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations, which went into effect
in July 2000, and which requires UK pension fund trustees to include in
their annual statement of investment principles ("S.I.P.") comments on the
following:
The extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or ethical considerations
are taken into account in the selection, retention and realisation of invest-
ments; [and]
Their policy (if any) directing the exercise of rights (including voting rights)
attaching to investments. 2
18
While this is, on its face, a disclosure statute, its purpose is to
encourage pension funds to ask their investment managers to consider
these stakeholder issues in constructing investment portfolios, and to
encourage the investment managers to ask pertinent questions of the com-
panies in which they invest. The intended effect of this statute is thus to
Metamorphosis of "Germany, Inc.", supra note 22, at 508 (quoting Charles Arthur, The
Fat Cats Are Back, Purring Excuses as They Lap up Rich Rewards for Their Work, THE
INDEPENDENT (LONDON) 3 (July 25, 2000)).
216. See Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance, supra note 98, at 9. These
two points could be related, in that a company that does not split the CEO and Chair-
man position would generally lack a board counterweight to the power of the CEO to
effectively set his own compensation. For a discussion of the "managerial power"
hypothesis as the explanation for the exceptionally high levels of CEO compensation in
the United States, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
217. See AARONSON & REEvEs, supra note 46, at 25.
218. Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations (1996) SI 1996/3172,
available at www.hmso.gov.uk/sr/sr1996/Nisr-19960584en1.htm.
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compel company managers to give more'information to pension fund trust-
ees and investment managers on their companies' economic, social, and
environmental performance. 2 19 Perhaps as a consequence, as of 2001,
89% of the top 100 companies in the UK included health, safety, environ-
mental, or social information in their financial reports, and 49% of them
published a separate report containing this information. 2 20 Since pension
funds hold 35% of the financial assets held by institutional investors in the
UK,2 2 1 their questions "beyond the bottom line" could have a significant
impact on the business practices of portfolio companies.
The actual effect of this law is currently under review, both by Just
Pensions, an NGO committed to encouraging more socially responsible
investment, and by the government, and neither seems terribly impressed
with what they have found to date. A survey by Just Pensions does show
that almost half of the pension fund trustees it surveyed do expect their
questions and engagement with portfolio companies eventually to have an
impact on how those companies manage their social and environmental
issues.22 2 The general conclusion of the Just Pensions report is that the
promise of the pension fund amendment has yet to be fully realized, how-
ever, and that "a gap has emerged between policy and practice. '22 3 Simi-
larly, the government's analysis concluded that pension funds' engagement
with portfolio companies and the funds' policies on socially responsible
investment have not changed substantially since the S.I.P. amendment
went into effect, except in the case of very large funds.2 24 Yet the govern-
ment recognized that changes in the largest funds' behavior may well pro-
duce profound consequences, since "changes made by just seven per cent
of occupational pension schemes affect 64% of all memberships.
22 5
Our interviews bore out the view that the S.I.P. amendment is having a
profound effect on large pension fund behavior. The S.I.P. amendment was
identified by one fund manager we interviewed as having been an "amaz-
ing and powerful catalyst" for socially responsible investment and for
encouraging some fund managers to engage with their portfolio companies
219. See AARONSON and REEVES, supra note 46, at 29-30.
220. See KPMG International Survey of Corporate Sustainability Reporting 2002,
supra note 16, at 16.
221. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: 1992-2001, at 19 (2004).
222. See Chris Gribben & Leon Olson, Ashbridge Center for Business & Society, UK
Social Investment Fund, Will U.K. Pension Funds Become More Responsible? 3-4
(2004), available at http://www.uksif.org/J/Z/Z/lib/2004/files/01/jp-ukpf-will/ukpf
2004-justpens.pdf (finding that 42% of pension trustees who responded think that pen-
sion fund activism will lead to "substantial improvements" in the way companies man-
age social and environmental issues in the next ten years).
223. Id. at 4.
224. See 2 SARAH HORACK Er AL., THE MYNERS PRINCIPLES AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSION
SCHEMES: FINDINGS FROM QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 5 (Dep't for Work & Pensions Research,
Report No. 213, 2004), available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2003-
2004/rrep213.asp.
225. Id. at 3.
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on CSR issues.226 Another fund manager said that his firm had recently
been asked by one of its largest clients, a public pension fund, to report
back on progress on the CSR principles identified in the fund's S.I.P. As he
put the point, "when one of your largest clients is asking about the environ-
ment and labor issues in the supply chain, you listen."22 7 Unlike most
developments in the CSR field, the S.I.P. amendment is not a voluntary self-
regulatory endeavor initiated by companies. 228 Accordingly, this law has
the potential to affect the thinking and actions of a broader range of compa-
nies than does self-regulation by corporate leaders. Moreover, since the
government is currently in the process of evaluating the law, it may eventu-
ally do more to advance its underlying policy goals.2 2 9 The S.I.P. amend-
ment, when evaluated in conjunction with the OFR requirements directed
specifically to companies' management, is yet another source of pressure
for divergence from the U.S. short-term shareholder wealth maximization
model.
In addition to promulgating these laws, the UK government has been
active in encouraging companies to think more carefully about social and
environmental responsibilities, and has been a leading influence in a num-
ber of public/private partnerships on specific CSR issues. 230 It has
appointed a Minister for Social Responsibility, currently Stephen
Timms,2 3 1 and has a website detailing all of the government's CSR initia-
226. We did not promise anonymity in our interviews. Nonetheless, in keeping with
what we believe to be the spirit of the interviews, we do not name persons or organiza-
tions except where we were asking questions about public statements or public actions
by that person or organization, or except where we have explicit authorization from the
named individual. We have notes on file for all of our interviews and have sent draft
copies of this Article to everyone we interviewed, asking for comments and providing an
opportunity to correct quotes if necessary.
227. Interview with Rob Lake, Head of Corporate Engagement, Henderson Global
Investors, London, England (Feb. 25, 2005) (notes on file with author).
228. We recognize that in the globalizing economy there is an increasingly blurred
line between voluntary industry self-regulation and mandatory law, particularly given
"new governance" understandings of how Governments interact with private entities.
See supra note 169.
229. The UK Government also passed a law in 2000 specifically directed at the trust-
ees of UK charities requiring them to ensure that investments are "suitable." Trustee
Act, 2000, c. 29, § 4(3)(a). According to the Charity Commission's interpretation, this
means that trustees are required to take into account not only financial suitability but
also suitability with regard to the charity's stated aims, "applying relevant ethical consid-
erations as to the kind of investments that are appropriate for the trust to make." Char-
ity Commission, Operational Guidance, Trustee Act 2000: General Power of Investment,
para. 7.3 (2002), available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/supportingchari-
ties/ogs/g086b001.asp. This has the effect of requiring charitable trusts to engage in
SRI screening.
230. See Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and "Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas
Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457 (2004) (discussing actions of the UK govern-
ment to address specific human rights issues in the oil and gas industry by convening
public and private partnerships to develop standards of best practices).
231. See DTI Ministerial Team, Stephen Timms MP, at http://www.dti.gov.uk/minis-
ters/ministers/timms.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
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tives.2 32 As the website states, the UK government has "[aln ambitious
vision for UK businesses to consider the economic, social and environmen-
tal impacts of their activities, wherever they operate in the world. ' 233 Vari-
ous documents linked to the website portray a wide array of UK
government initiatives, both domestic and international, to promote CSR,
to develop public-private partnerships to address such specific issues as
climate change or economic inequality, to make the business case for CSR,
and to develop a CSR Academy. 2 34 While a distinct flavor of self-promo-
tion is to be expected in such a website, it is probably not an exaggeration
when Minister Timms states that "[tihe UK is increasingly seen as one of
the leading contributors internationally on CSR thinking and practice. '235
B. Market Influences
Signals from the government and the Commissions it establishes only
represent a part of the relevant influences on corporate managers' thinking
and action. There are powerful market influences encouraging shareholder
thinking in the UK, Europe in general, and the United States: stock options
as an important part of executive compensation; market and financial
press pressures to show quarter-by-quarter increases in growth and profits;
and the market for corporate control, to name three of the strongest. 236
Still, we suggest that in the UK there are stronger pro-stakeholder influ-
ences, even among some market actors, particularly institutional investors.
In addition, these market signals are amplified in the UK by the sophisti-
cated NGO community, and by the geographic concentration of many of
these actors in and around London, leading to a situation where norms of
responsible corporate conduct are shifting more rapidly than in the United
States to encompass stakeholder concerns.
1. Institutional Investors
One corporate governance development of importance in both the
United States and the UK is that institutional investor concentration in
both markets has increased dramatically since the 1970s.2 3 7 The pattern
observed by Professors Black and Coffee at the beginning of the 1990s,
that "[t]he UK equities market is... more institutionally dominated than
232. The UK Government Gateway to Corporate Social Responsibility, at http://www.
csr.gov.uk/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
233. See id.
234. See Dep't of Trade & Indus., Corporate Social Responsibility: A Government
Update 4 (2004), available at http://www.csr.gov.uk/pdf/dti-Csr-final.pdf (quoting CSR
Minister Stephen Timms that "[m]ainstreaming CSR into management practice is central
to maximising its contribution to business success and to achieving our sustainable
development goals[,j" and that one of his priorities "is to establish ... a CSR Academy
which will support the development of CSR skills across business practice").
235. See id. at 3.
236. See supra notes 21 and 38 and accompanying text.
237. See also Bernard S. Black and John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REx'. 1997, 2001-02 (1994) (dis-
cussing the influence of institutional investors in the UK).
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the U.S. stock market," 238 remains true. "[Iinstitutional investors collec-
tively account for about seventy per cent of listed UK equities, '239 while
accounting for only 60% of listed U.S. equities. 240 But the differing com-
positions of institutional ownership in the two countries may be even more
significant. In the UK, insurance companies hold 51% of institutionally-
owned or managed financial assets, pension funds hold 35%, and mutual
funds hold 14%; in the U.S., insurance companies hold 21% of institution-
ally-owned or managed financial assets, pension funds hold 33%, and
mutual funds hold 34%, with 14% held by other institutional investors
(such as bank trust departments).241 Thus, in the UK, 86% of institutional
assets are held by insurance companies and pension funds-entities that
have long-term pay-out obligations-versus 54% in the United States. 242 In
contrast, the U.S. market has a heavier concentration of mutual funds
(34% versus 14% in the UK), and these might generally be assumed to
have a shorter-term investment horizon.243
We suggest that the greater concentration of longer-term investors in
the UK is one factor that has led to more attention being paid in that mar-
ket to longer-term social and environmental risks. We recognize that there
is not a direct translation between pension funds' or insurance companies'
putative long-term interests and their investment and voting behavior, par-
ticularly since both pension funds and insurance companies typically dele-
238. See id. at 2002.
239. See Geof Stapledon, Analysis and Data of Share Ownership and Control in the
UK, available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/staple.pdf (analyzing 1997 data); see also
National Statistics, Share Ownership: A Report on Ownership of Shares as at 31st
December 2003, available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/themeeconomy/
ShareOwnership2003.pdf.
240. See Insurance Information Institute, Savings, Investment, and Debt Ownership:
Ownership of Equities and Corporate Municipal Bonds, available at http://financialser-
vicesfacts.org/financial2/savings/investments (analyzing 2003 data).
241. See OECD, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1992-2001, fig.1
(2001).
242. Most of the business of life insurance companies in the UK is effectively savings
and investment, and customers can earn annual bonuses depending on the success of
the insurance company's investments. See Myners Review, supra note 115, at para. 90.
As a result, insurance companies compete in commercial markets selling to individuals,
id. at 33-34, and cannot be considered an unmitigated long-term influence in the mar-
ket. However, their turnover rates are low compared to U.S. institutional investors, see
Black & Coffee, supra note 237, at 2010, and a number of insurance companies are
participating in projects to address long-term challenges such as climate change or
emerging markets government corruption. See infra notes 281&282 and accompanying
text. Professors Black and Coffee note that the annual turnover rate for life insurers in
the UK is lower than only a few "heavily indexed U.S. pension funds and a few excep-
tional U.S. money managers." Black & Coffee, supra note 237, at 2010.
243. In specific cases, this would depend on whether they are actively managed or
indexed, whether they practice socially-responsible investing, and in which investment
sector they operate. Yet, as one Wall Street investment manager recently said, to under-
stand the short-term orientation in the United States, "you just need to look at who's
paying the Street today-hedge funds-and they have the highest turnover and shortest
time horizon of any type of institutional investor." Remarks at the CERES and Wirth
Chair Conference on Climate Change Risks and the SEC (October 18, 2004) (authors'
notes on file).
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gate fund management to investment professionals who may not share
those long-term perspectives or who are under their own short-term com-
petitive pressures. 2 44 Yet British insurance investors have typically been
long-term investors, with much lower turnover in their portfolios than all
but a few U.S. institutional investors. 245 And eleven of the twenty leading
fund managers for the UK pension industry are members or affiliates of the
UK Social Investment Forum, as are seven of the top ten fund managers in
the UK charity sector, 2 46 which is some evidence that concerns about long-
term social and environmental risks are being translated into fund manage-
ment. Moreover, the government has created a policy framework that
encourages both a long-term perspective and institutional investor activism
on corporate governance and CSR.2 4 7
As described above, the 1998 Hampel Committee Report was signifi-
cant for a number of reasons, including its attention to shareholder democ-
racy and its observation that institutional investors were not using their
voting power in proportion to their concentration in the market. 248 One
response to this conclusion was the promulgation of Section 2 of the Com-
bined Code, directed to institutional investors' responsibilities. 24 9 This
section contains three principles: that institutional investors should "enter
into a dialogue with companies based on the mutual understanding of
objectives," that they should carefully evaluate companies' disclosure con-
cerning corporate governance arrangements, and that "[ilnstitutional
shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their
votes."250
a) The Myners Review
In 2000, the government responded further to Hampel by initiating a
review of institutional investment behavior. This review, the Myners
244. See Stapledon, supra note 239, at 5.
245. Black and Coffee, supra note 237, at 2012. Professors Black and Coffee note that
the annual turnover rate for life insurers in the U.K. was lower than only a few "heavily
indexed U.S. pension funds and a few exceptional U.S. money managers." Id.
246. See European Sustainable Responsible Investment Forum, Socially Responsible
Investment Among European Institutional Investors: 2003 Report, at 21 (2003), available
at http://www.eurosif.org/pub2/lib/2003/10/srirept/eurosif-srireprt-2003-all.pdf. This
high level of fund management affiliation with the U.K. Social Investment Forum may
reflect the fact that pension funds are asking their fund managers to create social and
environmental policies for the pensions' S.I.P., pursuant to the pension funds legislation
described above, and so fund managers recognize a business advantage in having some
expertise in this regard. A number of our interviews with pension fund personnel and
investment fund managers in the UK suggest this interpretation.
247. This framework includes not only the legislation specifically addressed to pen-
sion funds and charitable trusts discussed above, but also the Hampel Committee and
the Myners Review of Institutional Investment. See supra notes 111-120 and accompa-
nying text; supra notes 218-229 and accompanying text regarding legislation addressed
to pension funds and charitable trusts; infra notes 251-259 and accompanying text
regarding the Myners Committee.
248. See supra notes 218-229 and accompanying text.
249. See 2003 Combined Code, supra note 111, § 2 (section entitled "Institutional
Shareholders").
250. Id. at paras. E.1-E.3.
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Review,25 1 ultimately focused much of its attention on the management of
the assets of the occupational pension fund sector of the market, recogniz-
ing the importance of the pension fund sector both to the economy, by
providing capital, and to individuals' long-term economic well-being. A
number of problems were identified, including the unrealistic expectations
of pension fund trustees who were typically not professionals, who were
"under-resourced," and who consequently relied on a "narrow range of
expertise. 25 2 Myners criticized the vagueness of the time frames by which
these investment firms would be measured. The consultants pointed to the
quarterly trustees' meeting, which focused fund managers' attention on
short-term performance, while trustees insisted that they would not replace
fund managers for "poor performance over the short term."'25 3 The Myners
Review found this lack of clarity to be a possible contributor to short-term-
ism in the City, and inconsistent with the long-term nature of pension
funds' obligations. 25 4 The Myners Review also identified as a problem
pension fund managers' general reluctance to intervene "to tackle corpo-
rate underperformance in investee companies, particularly pre-emptive
action to prevent troubled companies developing serious problems."
25 5
To address these problems, Myners made a number of proposals to
increase the professionalism of fund trustees and provide clarity to their
relationship with fund managers. 256 It also recommended that "the U.S.
Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin on Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) 1974 which deals with [shareholder voting
and engagement] be included in fund management mandates, and incorpo-
rated in law."'2 5 7 Myners construed the Bulletin as "clearly articulat[ing]
251. See Myners Review, supra note 115, at 1-2.
252. Id. at 9.
253. Id. at 10.
254. See id. at 10.
255. Id.
256. These included suggestions that trustees should clarify their investment objec-
tives and include information about them in their Statement of Investment Principles, to
be sent out to members annually; should normally be paid; should attend to asset alloca-
tion; should be clearer in their instructions to their investment managers on whether to
index or not and on the time frame over which performance would be judged; should set
investment objectives for their professional managers that are consistent with the funds'
investment objectives; and should measure the performance of the funds and of their
professional managers. See id. at 21-22.
257. Id. at 14. The interpretive bulletin to which the Myners Review refers is Interpre-
tive Bulletin 94-2, which identifies the voting of proxies as a fiduciary duty and requires
that, in voting proxies, "the responsible fiduciary consider those factors that may affect
the value of the plans' investment and not subordinate the interests of the participants
and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives." Interpretive Bulle-
tin Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policy or
Guidelines, 29 CFR § 2509.94-2 (2004). This Interpretive Bulletin also recognizes the
following:
[Shareholder activism] intended to monitor or influence the management of
companies in which the plan owns stock is consistent with a fiduciary's obliga-
tions under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a rea-
sonable expectation that such monitoring or communication with
management ... is likely to enhance the value of the plan's investment[.]
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the duties of managers to intervene in companies-by voting or other-
wise -where there is a reasonable expectation that doing so might raise the
value of the investment. '258 The Review also endorsed use of the Cadbury
model, which required companies to "comply [with best practice] or
explain," to shape behavior in this regard.25 9
b) The Government's Response to the Myners Review
In response, in 2001 the UK government announced that it would
"take forward all the Myners Review's recommendations,"260 that it would
endorse Myners' voluntarist approach of defining best practice and asking
funds to "comply or explain," but that in two years it would conduct a
qualitative and quantitative review to determine if industry practices had
changed to follow the principles. 261 The clear implication was that there
could be a legislative solution to the identified problems if the voluntary
approach proved insufficient. The two-year review has just been com-
pleted, and it concluded in general that there has been "significant volun-
tary progress towards adopting the Myners Principles," particularly among
large pension funds (those with 1,000 members or more), and particularly
in the areas of asset allocation, establishing clear objectives, and selecting
appropriate benchmarks. 262 The government found that less progress had
been made on shareholder activism, except among the largest funds. 263
How the government will respond to these findings remains to be seen.
c) Institutional Investor Initiatives
According to our preliminary interviews of investment professionals,
pension fund employees, and SRI fund managers in London, the threat of
potentially onerous legislation has been an important motivator for some
Id. It is ironic that Myners, and the Government in its response, would so explicitly
endorse the approach of the Interpretive Bulletin, since many observers in the United
States have interpreted it as potentially limiting the extent to which fund managers may
incorporate concerns about social, environmental, or ethical issues into their voting
behavior. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 1018, 1076 (1998) (discussing
the controversy over whether fund managers have the power to consider other values
beyond shareholder wealth maximization, given the Interpretative Bulletin mentioned
above); see also WILLiAM M. O'B~AR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH
AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 229-32 (1992) (discussing the influence of fund
managers in shaping the corporate governance debate over the Interpretive Bulletin).
258. Id.
259. See id. at 16. Myners suggested, however, that the "scale of the distortions it has
identified would justify requiring funds to report their compliance with the principles
through legislation, if the industry does not adopt them voluntarily." Id.
260. HM Treasury & Dep't for Work and Pensions, Myners Review: Institutional
Investment in the UK: The Government's Response 2 (2001), available at http://www.
dwp.gov.uk/publications/dss/2001/myners/response.pdf.
261. See id. at 29, annex B.
262. Sarah Horack et al., Dep't for Work and Pensions, Research Summary: The
Myners Principles and Occupational Pension Schemes (2004), available at http://www.
dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/summ2003-2004/213summ.pdf.
263. See id.
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to become more actively engaged with portfolio companies. 264 The threat
of legislation, in conjunction with Myners' emphasis on the S.I.P., also pro-
vided activists within some of these institutions with additional leverage to
promote greater sensitivity to social and environmental issues at portfolio
companies, particularly where such issues pose long-term financial risks.
Increased engagement and activism are evident in a number of actions
by coalitions of institutional investors in the UK. Thus, in 2002, in a direct
response to Myners, members of the Institutional Shareholders Committee
("ISC") issued its own revised Statement of Principles for Institutional
Shareholders and Agents (revised from its 1991 Statement), which has now
been incorporated into the Combined Code.2 65 The ISC includes the
major trade associations for insurers (the Association of British Insurers),
for pension funds (the National Association of Pension Funds), for invest-
ment trusts (the Association of Investment Trust Companies), and for
investment managers (the Investment Management Association), and repre-
sents over 80% of institutional investment in the UK. 266 These Principles
deal with how ISC members will monitor corporate governance and per-
formance in portfolio companies, when they will intervene with manage-
ment of portfolio companies, and how they will evaluate the effectiveness
of their engagement and report to clients and beneficial owners.267 Rea-
sons for intervening with companies include strategy or performance con-
cerns; and corporate governance concerns, such as independent directors
"failing to hold executive management properly to account," "unjustifiable
failure to comply with the Combined Code," "inappropriate remuneration
levels/incentive packages/severance packages," or "the company's
approach to CSR. ''268 The ISC stated that it would monitor its own actions
in light of its Statement of Principles, and would be "refreshing" them, if
need be, in two years "in light of experience and market development. '269
That evaluating a company's approach to CSR is part of the identified
responsibilities of institutional investors, and that it is included in a policy
264. We recognize that, as law professors, we may have a tendency to overstate the
importance of legal and regulatory explanations for shifts in market behavior. Pension
funds and other institutional investors also have financial reasons to become engaged
owners-to exercise voice rather than exit-given the size of their investments, and given
that they may own broad swathes of the market as a whole. See JAMES HAWLEY &
ANDREW WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: How INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN
MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 1-29 (2000) (describing how growing con-
centration of institutional investors has created a new category of "universal owners"
with interests in the entire market, and incentives to exercise "voice" rather than "exit").
265. See 2003 Combined Code, supra note 111, para. E.1 (urging institutional share-
holders to apply the principles set out in the Institutional Shareholders' Committee's
document entitled "The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents-State-
ment of Principles" and stating that those responsibilities should be reflected in fund
manager contracts).
266. See Institutional Shareholders' Committee, The Responsibilities of Institutional
Shareholders and Agents: Statement of Principles 1 n.1 (2002), available at http://www.
abi.org.uk/Display/File/38/Statement-of-Principles.pdf.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 5.
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statement issued by over 80% of the entire institutional investment com-
munity, is evidence that the concept of CSR has become more generally
accepted in the British investment community than in the United States.
This evidence is buttressed by another set of guidelines, those of the
Association of British Insurers ("ABI"), issued in 2000, which represents
about 50% of institutional funds under management in the UK. In this
document, the ABI's Disclosure Guidelines on Socially-Responsible Invest-
ment, the ABI stated:
Public interest in CSR has grown to the point where it seems helpful for
institutional shareholders to set out basic disclosure principles, which will
guide them in seeking to engage with companies in which they invest.
In drawing up guidelines for this purpose they are mindful of statements
made at multilateral level through the Guidelines for Multinational Corpora-
tions published in 2000 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, as well as by the European Union and UK Government.
These, coupled with legal disclosure obligations on UK pension funds and
local authority investments, point to clear responsibility both for companies
and for institutions that invest in them.
Institutional shareholders are also anxious to avoid unnecessary prescrip-
tion or the imposition of costly burdens, which can unnecessarily restrict
the ability of companies to generate returns. Indeed, by focusing on the
need to identify and manage risks to the long and short-term value of the
business from social, environmental and ethical matters, the guidelines
highlight an opportunity to enhance value through appropriate response to
these risks. 270
The ABI Disclosure Guidelines, which predate the OFR, seek informa-
tion on an annual basis concerning the board's approach to taking regular
account of social, environmental, and ethical matters. This information
includes assurances that the board has identified short- and long-term
risks to the company from such matters, based on adequate information;
and that the company has an effective system in place to manage such
issues. 27 1 The guidelines also seek companies' actual analyses of short-
and long-term risks from social, environmental, and ethical issues, and
what processes were used to verify the information being provided.27 2 The
ABI explicitly articulated its hopes that the use of the guidelines would
"help companies to develop appropriate policies on CSR," and that
"[e]xamples of initiatives for reducing and managing risks [would] include
regular contact with stakeholders and mechanisms to ensure that appropri-
ate standards are maintained in the supply chain."'2 73 In an explicit incen-
tive to companies to develop CSR initiatives, the ABI stated that "[elvidence
of such initiatives would be viewed positively by shareholders. ' 27 4 Again,
that an industry association representing 50% of institutional investment
270. ABI, Disclosure Guidelines on Socially-Responsible Investment 1 (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.abi.org.uk/Display/File/85/SRIGuidelines.doc.
271. See id. at paras. 2(1.1)-(1.4).
272. See id. at paras. 2(2.1)-(2.4).
273. Id. at 2-3.
274. Id. at para. 5, at 3.
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has articulated such a clear statement of its expectations about CSR action
and disclosure indicates that CSR is more central to the ongoing discus-
sions of corporate conduct and governance in the UK than in the United
States, and understood as such by a wider swath of institutional
investors. 27 5
One early example of institutional investor interest in CSR issues was
the leadership of Friends, Ivory & Sime (which became ISIS Management
and is now F&C) on labor standards in the retail sector.2 76 Starting in
December of 1999, Friends Ivory & Sime ("Friends, Ivory") began discus-
sions about the conditions of labor in the global supply chains of eleven
UK clothing retailers whose stock it held, having formed the opinion that
there was significant reputational risk to those companies from these inter-
national labor issues.2 77 Over the course of the next eighteen months,
Friends, Ivory met with each of the retailers, developed information about
best practice to manage the risks of having child labor and sweatshops in
the supply chain, and organized seminars with industry participants to
develop greater awareness of these risks.2 78 By late 2001, Friends, Ivory
was satisfied that each of the eleven companies had made improvements
and was "on course for best practice risk management in this area."
2 79 ISIS
Management carried forward Friends, Ivory's concerns with CSR issues,
both by its active participation in a number of the institutional investor
275. A research report commissioned by the ABI provides further evidence of the pen-
etration of socially-responsible thinking among British insurers. See Roger Cose, Associ-
ation of British Insurers, Investing in Social Responsibility: Risks and Opportunities
(2001), available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Display/File/364/csr_- Report.pdf (examining
the various rationales for businesses to adopt CSR policies). The author identified two
strands of thinking about corporate governance risk, and its relation to CSR. One strand
has created dedicated teams using the research skills built up by the ethical
investment industry to create an 'engagement' approach to [social, ethical, and
environmental] risks. The aim of 'engagement' is to raise issues such as human
rights and environmental risk and to safeguard shareholder value by encourag-
ing companies to improve the management of such risks.
Id. at 8. Cowe identified a second, "broader SRI strand" as having developed among a
"range of institutions concerned with how to evaluate the quality of companies' SEE risk
management." Id. The SRI Forum, an informal network, includes a number of the larg-
est insurance and pension fund managers, including Barclays Global Investors, Baillie
Gifford, BP Pension Fund, Legal and General, ISIS, Gartmore, Hermes, Newton Invest-
ment Management, Morley Investment Management, Railpen Investments, as well as
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the ABI. Id.
276. ISIS Asset Management plc was formed by the merger of Friends Ivory & Sime
and Royal & SunAlliance Investments, and it was one of the UK's ten largest investment
companies. London Sustainability Exchange, Investment Firm Is Top Company for Sus-
tainable Business in City of London, at http://www.lsx.org.uk/news/default.aspx?id =
331 (Feb. 21, 2003). ISIS and F&C announced a merger in 2004, stating that they
would become the 4th largest asset manager in the U.K., and one of the top ten pension
fund managers in Europe, with £120 billion of assets under management ($216 billion
dollars, using late September 2004 exchange rates). See Press Release, ISIS, Merger of
ISIS and F&C To Create UK's Fourth Largest Asset Manager (July 2, 2004), available at
http://www.isisam.com/newsDetail.asp?newslD=325.
277. See Association of British Insurers Report, supra note 275, at 14.
278. See id.
279. See id.
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collaborations described below, and in its corporate governance policy,
which specifically evaluates the extent to which companies in which it
invests manage CSR issues properly and to which they. disclose informa-
tion to shareholders consistent with the ABI Disclosure Guidelines on
Socially Responsible Investment. 28 0
Institutional investor leadership can also be seen in a number of col-
laborative efforts in the UK to address other long-term social and environ-
mental issues such as climate change, HIV and AIDS, and developing
country government corruption. For instance, the Institutional Investors
Group on Climate Change ("IIGCC") engages with its members' portfolio
companies to "address any material risks to and opportunities for their
businesses associated with climate change and a shift to a lower carbon
economy."28 ' This coalition of institutional investors, currently chaired by
Raj Thamotheram of the Universities Superannuation Scheme (the fourth-
largest pension fund in the UK), includes a broad range of public and pri-
vate pension funds, insurance investors, and asset managers, including a
number of mainstream entities such as Merrill Lynch Investment Managers
(third-largest pension fund manager in the UK), Prudential Property
Investment Managers, and Schroder Investment Management (sixth-largest
pension fund manager in the UK). 28 2 Another British-based coalition of
global institutional investors, the Carbon Disclosure Project, recently
issued the results of its second survey of the Global 500 companies on the
strategic and financial implications of climate change.2 83 The response to
this survey almost tripled (from thirty-five to ninety-five companies) from
2002 to 2003; and the amount of assets represented by the Project's mem-
bership more than doubled from $4.5 trillion to over $10 trillion.28 4 While
the list of participating institutions includes a number of U.S.-based
socially responsible investment ("SRI") funds (Calvert, Domini Social
Investment, and Trillium Asset Management), public pension funds (New
York), and state treasurers (California, Maine, and Vermont), the over-
whelming majority of institutions were from the UK and the EU, despite
efforts to get broader U.S. representation. 28 5 Other institutional investor
coalitions in the UK address HIV and AIDS risks in their pharmaceutical
280. See F&C Asset Management, Corporate Governance Operational Guidelines 1
(2005), available at http://w v.isisam.com/uploadFiles/co-gsri-cgo-guidelines-gen-
eral.pdf.
281. Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, About the I.I.G.C.C., at http://
www.iigcc.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
282. See European Social Investment Forum, SRI among European Institutional Inves-
tors: 2003 Report 21 (2003), available at http://www.eurosif.org/pub2/lib/2003/l0/
srirept/eurosif-srireprt-2003-all.pdf.
283. See Press Release, Carbon Disclosure Project, $10 Trillion Investor Initiative
Rates 500 Largest Global Companies' Action on Climate Change (May 19, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.cdproject.net/press release.asp.
284. See id.
285. Interview with Paul Dickinson, Coordinator, Carbon Disclosure Project (Jan. 17,
2004) (on file with authors).
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portfolio companies, 28 6 and institutional investors have taken a leadership
role working with the UK government and NGOs to address corruption
and transparency issues in the extractives sector in emerging markets. 28 7
This is not to suggest, however, that all institutional investors in the
United States have been completely quiet on these long-term issues. There
are sectors that are pursuing the same complex of issues that UK institu-
tional investors advance. SRI mutual funds engage with portfolio compa-
nies on a broad range of social and environmental issues in the United
States, including long-term issues such as climate change, both informally,
through discussions with management, and formally, by putting proxy res-
olutions on the agenda of annual meetings.288 SRI funds and social
activist investment continued to grow in the United States in 2001 and
2002, despite equity market declines and net outflows from the rest of the
mutual fund industry, and this sector of the market is now about 11% of
professional money under management. 28 9 A number of public pension
funds are activists on social and environmental issues, such as the Califor-
nia Public Employees Retirement System, which is the largest public retire-
ment fund in the United States. 290 Recently, thirteen public pension and
labor funds in the United States formed the Investors' Network on Climate
Risk, which has called on the SEC to issue more explicit guidance to com-
panies about disclosing their risks from climate change. 2 9 1 So there is the
potential that climate change might become a "wedge issue" even in the
United States, drawing more institutional investors into the process of
thinking about the consequences of long-term social and environmental
issues for the value of their portfolios.
Yet, mutual funds are a larger sector of the institutional investor mar-
286. Interview with Raj Thamotheram, Universities Superannuation Scheme (Jan. 16,
2004) (on file with authors).
287. Interview with Karina A. Litvack, Director, Head of Governance and Socially
Responsible Investment, and Richard Singleton, Director, Corporate Governance, ISIS
Asset Management Uan. 16, 2004) (on file with authors); see also Williams, supra note
230, at 485-91 (describing extractive industry transparency initiative).
288. See Interview with Adam Kanzer, General Counsel, Domini Social Investments
(Feb. 20, 2004) (authors' notes on file) (discussing informal dialogues that occur
between SRI investors and managements of investee companies); I.C.C.R., Companies,
Resolutions, and Status, supra note 196.
289. See Social Investment Forum, 2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing
Trends in the United States, at ii (2004), available at www.socialinvest.org/areas/
research/trends/sri-trends reportt_2003.pdf.
290. See GORDON L. CLARK AND TESSA HEBB, WHY Do THEY CARE? THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 22-24
(Econ. Geography Research Group, Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper No. 04-15, 2004),
available at http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/wpapers/economic/wpgO4-15.pdf. (dis-
cussing California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS") engagement with
companies to raise social and environmental standards); see also CalPERS Shareowner
Forum, at http://www.calpers-governance.org/forumhome.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2004) (forum for discussing corporate governance and other topics).
291. See Press Release, Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, Thir-
teen Pension Leaders Call on SEC Chairman To Require Global Warming Risks in Cor-
porate Disclosure (April 15, 2004), available at http://ceres.org/newsroom/press/invest
sec disclosure.htm.
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ket in the United States than in the UK,292 and U.S. mutual funds show
little evidence of serious consideration of social and environmental issues.
That the largest institutional investors in the United States generally con-
sider social and environmental issues to be unrelated to shareholder value
can be seen in their proxy voting policies. An analysis by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center ("IRRC") in August 2003 reviewed the vot-
ing policies of 100 of the largest U.S. equity mutual funds, representing
half of equity mutual fund money under management. It found that "most
funds generally vote with management on shareholder proposals address-
ing environmental, labor and other social issues."' 293 While most funds
characterize social issues as "ordinary business," to be left to the discretion
of management, a number stated that they would make exceptions where
"a proposal might have a substantial economic impact on a company they
own," and yet "none provided specific examples of social proposals that
pose such economic impacts."'294 The IRRC's analysis of actual voting, as
of August 2004, found that "a majority of the nation's 100 largest mutual
funds opposed all social issue shareholder resolutions," another 15% voted
against nearly all such proposals, while about 30% cast abstentions.
295
It is possible that the new proxy voting disclosure requirements will
start to have an impact on these trends in the United States as well,
although we do not see changes so far, as the recent IRRC study indicates.
As argued above, proxy voting disclosure will likely increase the power of
labor to ensure that fund managers investing workers' pension funds vote
consistent with the AFL-CIO's voting policies. 296 It may reveal pervasive
but previously hidden conflicts of interest that have, "for the most part,
limited institutional willingness to engage in activism."'297 Yet, proxy vot-
ing disclosure alone seems unlikely to be strong enough to bridge the gap
between mainstream institutional investor behavior in the United States
and the UK.
Institutional shareholder activism on social and environmental risks
in the United States has so far failed to garner as broad a level of support as
in the UK. A further factor that may account for this gap is the political
and economic context in London, which has created conditions especially
conducive to changes in the norms concerning responsible corporate
action. We turn now to that subject.
292. The comparable institutions in the UK are called investment trusts or unit trusts.
OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES 33 (2004) (comparing
composition of institutional investors between countries).
293. See I.R.R.C., Mutual Funds Seldom Support Social Proposals, IRRC SOCIAL ISSUES
REP., Aug.-Sep. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.irrc.org/company/0903-Mutual
Funds.pdf.
294. See id.
295. See Press Release, IRRC, Most Mutual Funds Opposed All Social Proposals (Sept.
15, 2004), available at http://www.irrc.com/company/Mutual-Funds_0904.html.
296. See supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text.
297. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 187, at 281. Professors Choi and Fisch claim that
institutions unhappy with a firm's management are unlikely to be activists in a proxy
contest or engaging in tough discussions with management. We assert that this point
applies equally to social and environmental engagement.
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2. The Economic Culture of London
We have argued that institutional investors in the UK are taking more
of a long-term perspective and activist role than their counterparts in the
United States, and have suggested a number of reasons why this might be
the case. The difference may be partially attributable to the differing com-
positions of the institutional investor populations in the two countries,
with that in the UK more heavily weighted towards investors with long-term
obligations. Yet pension funds comprise about a third of the institutional
market in both countries. 298 One might therefore expect to see a similar
long-term orientation in that sector in the United States, but it is not as
apparent.2 99 Another possible explanation for the difference is the fact
that in the UK, unlike in the United States, government is playing a strong
role in encouraging institutional investor engagement in both corporate
governance and CSR, using regulatory tools to compel companies and
investors to identify and disclose social and environmental risks. This gov-
ernment leadership will surely continue to influence both institutional
investors and companies, so we would expect to see continued divergence
between the two countries as long as the U.S. government maintains its
passive stance.
But these explanations may not fully account for the greater willing-
ness of institutional investors in the UK to identify long-term social and
environmental risks as material. Leading members of the institutional
investor community in the UK have identified climate change, HIV and
AIDS, global labor standards, and government corruption in emerging mar-
kets as long-term financial threats to their portfolio companies. Indeed,
Professors Clark and Hebb have argued that it is because of the long-term
financial risks inherent in these issues that institutional investors care
about them at all. 30 0 Why would they be any less threatening to U.S.
global corporations than to their British counterparts? Surely U.S. multina-
tionals are equally vulnerable to the damage to reputation, stock price vola-
tility, and rising cost of capital that social, ethical, and environmental
misconduct can bring about. 30 1 The question thus remains why institu-
298. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
299. As noted above, many retirement funds delegate portfolio management to exter-
nal fund managers, which, in the United States, are often mutual fund companies such
as Vanguard or Fidelity-the companies the IRRC found seldom supported social or
environmental proxy proposals. See supra notes 293-295 and accompanying text. (Hav-
ing no other direct source of information, we use their voting behavior as an indication
of concern for social and environmental risk.) In the UK, external delegation also
occurs, but half of the money managers to whom authority is delegated are members of
the UK Social Investment Forum, a socially responsible investment coalition. See supra
note 246 and accompanying text.
300. See Clark & Hebb, supra note 116, passim. To be fair, some large institutional
investors in the country-most notably CaIPERS-have demonstrated similar concerns,
as have members of the SRI community.
301. See Clark & Hebb, supra note 116, at 3, 6-7 (describing increasing vulnerability
of global companies to attacks on their brand and reputation from publicized CSR
failings).
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tional investors in the UK have been more aggressive in recognizing these
risks than their American counterparts.
In addition to the factors discussed above, we believe that geography
matters. Specifically, the unique economic culture of London has played a
significant role in promoting change in the norms regarding responsible
investing and corporate management. London is at once a predominant
center of international finance30 2 and the perceived center of gravity of the
CSR movement. 30 3 Although London's capital markets are considerably
smaller than America's in terms of sheer volume, they are still huge30 4 and
especially important with respect to cross-border listings and trades. 30 5 At
the same time, the NGO community, which has become increasingly
important in world finance and world politics generally, 30 6 is large and
well-established in London. As Simon Zadek has put the point, the UK has
"what are probably the world's most powerful set of development, environ-
mental, and human rights organizations. Multinational NGOs like
Amnesty and Oxfam represent merely the tip of a powerful cocktail of pres-
sure groups that top the charts of every UK public opinion poll when it
comes to matters of trust .... 307
That important financial institutions, powerful companies, and influ-
ential NGOs are concentrated in and around London means that personal
communication is possible and relationships of trust and respect can be,
and are being, created. Ten years ago, relationships between NGOs and
large companies were primarily adversarial, while today partnerships and
multistakeholder dialogues among institutional investors, NGOs, and com-
panies are becoming common. 30 8 While our interviews in this regard are
preliminary, everyone we have spoken to in London has emphasized that
lines of communication are now in place throughout the corporate, institu-
302. See Gordon L. Clark, London in the European Financial Services Industry: Loca-
tional Advantage and Product Complementarities, 2 J. EcON. GEOGRAPHY 433, 438 (2002).
Professor Clark identifies four markets that are brought together in London: the domes-
tic UK market, with its highly concentrated institutional character; an "interchange"
market between the United States and Europe, facilitating currency trades and corporate
transactions in both directions, and extending to Asia; a European market, providing
financial services and products to European firms and Governments; and services to
private equity markets and sovereign institutions from the rest of the world. Id.
303. See SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION: THE NEW ECONOMY OF CORPORATE CITI-
ZENSHIP 30-33 (2001) (discussing British leadership in the CSR movement).
304. The differences between the United States and the UK as well as the size of the
British markets can be appreciated by comparing the size of the NYSE to the LSE: the
NYSE has a $19.5 trillion market capitalization with just under 2,800 listed companies
as of December 2004, NYSE, Market Statistics, at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?
displayPage=/Marketinfo/1022221393893.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (NYSE data),
while the LSE has just under 2,700 listed companies and a $6.2 trillion market capitali-
zation as of March 2004. Exchange-The Magazine of the London Stock Exchange, at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/l D 1B3DOF-2C59-431E-B22D-A9
DC54923312/0/2834.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
305. See Clark, supra note 302, at 433-34.
306. See generally RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVE-
MENTS, NETWORKS & NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram et al. eds., 2002).
307. ZADEK, supra note 303, at 32.
308. See id. at 32, 82.
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tional investor, government, and NGO communities. In many cases, ties
among these actors are long-term and based on shared cultural assump-
tions. 30 9 There are also quiet but regular conversations between institu-
tional investors and companies on a range of corporate governance and
CSR issues that go directly to the top of the company, bypassing the inves-
tor relations departments or scripted analysts' calls that typify such com-
munications in the United States.
3 10
Significantly, each of the people we have interviewed in London has
had recent experiences communicating with people from U.S. institutional
investment houses. All have come away with the view that on corporate
governance there are similarities between U.S. and British perspectives,
but, on CSR, the United States "is ten years behind us," as one person put
it. Another person suggested that the debate over CSR in the United States
is more polarized than in Britain. 3 1 1 The London market's unique combi-
nation of financial clout, physical compactness, and economic culture
seems to be a major factor in promoting this differential evolution. 3 12
309. See Clark, supra note 302, at 435 n.4 for historical sources on the social and
cultural networks within the City of London.
310. See Clark & Hebb, supra note 116, at 20-21 (describing "quiet diplomacy" of the
Universities' Superannuation Scheme, the UK's third largest pension fund, on climate
risk and HIV/Aids); Armour et. al., supra note 12, at 548 (describing actions of Hermes
Investment Management, Ltd. regarding corporate governance and CSR); cf. Black &
Coffee, supra note 237, at 2000 (describing close-knit world of institutional investors
and communications among them on matters of performance and corporate
governance).
311. He provided a hypothetical example to illustrate his point. So, he stated, assume
one argued that ExxonMobil shouldn't push to open the Artic for more oil drilling
because of the controversy that could be drummed up by activist shareholders or NGO
campaigners. That would be considered "a perfectly reasonable view" in London, but
he'd be called a "communist" by colleagues in the U.S. branch of his firm for making
that argument. This "mainstream" institutional investor (whose company is part of U.K.
Social Investment Forum) is not convinced that the social and environmental informa-
tion to be required in the OFR "moves share price," and also thinks that some of the
institutional investors that care about these issues have a disproportionate voice in the
discussion. Still, he acknowledged that how a company handles social and environmen-
tal risks is indicative of the quality of management generally, and so is useful informa-
tion to have, and that "no one can be against more disclosure."
312. Space constraints preclude our contrasting the importance of labor arrange-
ments in the UK to United States and their effects on corporate governance, but here,
too, varying institutional pressures can be observed. Labor density is much higher in
the UK than in the United States: 32% of full-time employees are members of labor
unions in England, 38% in Wales, 35% in Scotland, and 39% in Northern Ireland, com-
pared to 12.5% in the United States. Stephen Hicks & Tom Palmer, Dep't of Trade &
Indus., Trade Union Membership: Estimates from the Autumn 2003 Labour Force Sur-
vey (2004), available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/labour markettrends/
Trade union membership.pdf (UK statistics); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union
Members in 2004 (Jan. 27, 2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
union2.pdf (U.S. statistics). As a result, the "working out" of shareholder wealth maxi-
mizing will be different in the two countries, even without the different views of corpo-
rate purpose that we observe, since companies in the UK will be required to take more
cognizance of employees. Professors Armour, Deakin & Konzelmann have studied this
issue in depth and have concluded that "[b]eyond the core [UK corporate governance
arrangements], in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law,
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Conclusion
The past decade has seen parallel, incremental changes in some inter-
national corporate governance law and practice that may portend a funda-
mental shift in governance theory. On the legal front, in some
jurisdictions, there has been a subtle shift in focus from shareholder wealth
alone to a broader conception of stakeholder interests, although this shift
may be swamped by market forces that promote shareholder interests, at
least in the short term. This legal evolution has coincided with the growing
visibility and respectability of the CSR movement, which demands that cor-
porations engage in a dialogue with their diverse stakeholders and act in
response to their concerns about the social and environmental impact of
corporate behavior. Both trends are evident in the countries of Continental
Europe, which have adopted a variety of measures that require corpora-
tions to respond explicitly to the concerns of employees and other non-
shareholder constituencies, and to report on matters that affect short-term
share prices indirectly if at all. Similar momentum has manifested itself in
the European Union, which has gone so far as to endorse sustainable
growth as a proper corporate goal, with due attention to the social and
environmental consequences of corporate actions.
The United States, despite some small changes at the legal margins,
continues to adhere to a legal regime focused almost entirely on short-term
shareholder wealth maximization. Until very recently, the UK has followed
a similar path, the two countries presenting to the rest of the world an
ostensibly unified Anglo-American front. Recently, however, a distinctly
British approach has emerged: the "third way" of our title. On a number of
governance issues, including takeovers and the role of labor, the UK contin-
ues to resist European influences. In other respects, though, shareholder
capitalism in the UK is beginning to diverge from its American counter-
part. Indeed, the UK has very recently emerged as a leader in demanding
that companies recognize and report to their extended stakeholder constit-
uencies. The expanded social and environmental disclosure mandate in
the UK, seen within the context of changes in institutional investor legal
regulation, norms and behavior, is evidence that a British "enlightened
share value" corporate governance theory is coming to occupy a unique
third position between the American shareholder wealth-maximizing posi-
tion and the continental stakeholder model. The UK's goal appears to be
to maintain its corporations' financial accountability to a constituency of
dispersed, independent shareholders while simultaneously using market
forces to push companies in the direction of greater social responsibility,
and a longer-term evaluation of corporate value.
Perhaps the major question for American readers is whether the
United States will follow Britain's lead. We believe that the global CSR
movement has played a major role in motivating the changes in corporate
governance theory that we have described. Although the origins of the CSR
stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks largely to European Community
influence." Armour et al., supra note 12, at 1.
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movement may lie in the United States, specifically in the agitation for
South African divestment in the 1970s, its subsequent influence has been
felt more prominently in Europe. In this country, although stakeholders'
interests are starting to be articulated with more vigor and efficacy, the
CSR movement has yet to gain the mainstream acceptance that it enjoys in
the UK and the rest of Europe. This would suggest that the United States
will let the UK go its third way and cling to shareholder value primacy
unless and until a maturing CSR community compels it to do otherwise. It
may be that there is no causal relationship between CSR and corporate
governance reform, and that they are unrelated movements, or at most
manifestations of the same underlying concerns. Even if this is correct, a
broadening conception of what is economically material to a company may
drive the United States in Britain's direction. Only time will tell.

